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Are political actors influenced by their acceptance of risk? By political actors I mean 
individuals in society or government that have an influence on political outcomes. By risk 
acceptance I mean the degree to which an individual is comfortable with uncertainty and willing 
to challenge the status quo. The purpose of the present dissertation is to further enhance scholarly 
understanding of the causal psychological mechanisms that influence political behavior by 
considering individual risk acceptance.  
Kam’s (2012) theoretical framework suggests that risk-accepting individuals are more 
likely to participate in politics because they seek out exciting and novel activities. She does not, 
however, find any evidence that the risk accepting are any more likely to vote. I argue that enforced 
compulsory sanctions provide exciting opportunities for the highly risk accepting to abstain from 
compulsory elections, but also create higher levels of uncertainty for those with low levels of risk 
acceptance, which leads to a greater likelihood of voting for the latter but not the former. If you 
are a risk acceptor, you may be willing to violate the compulsory voting requirement.  
I also expand Kam’s (2012) theoretical framework in Chapter 5 by considering how risk 
acceptance influences the decision to protest. I argue that because nondemocracies are more 
repressive than democracies, the risk accepting may be more likely to protest in non-democratic 
countries than their less risk-accepting counterparts. On the other hand, low risk-accepting 
individuals may be more hesitant in their willingness to risk life and limb by challenging the status 
quo of non-democratic regimes because non-democratic countries are more likely to repress 
political detractors.  
Finally, political scholars theorize that legislators are hesitant to make risky decisions in 




legislative decision making. In Chapter 6 I use a novel theoretical framework and measure of risk 







CHAPTER 1.  AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK ACCEPTANCE AND POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR 
 
If I ask you to think of a risky activity you may think of driving without a seatbelt, smoking 
cigarettes, or jumping out of an airplane. Making political decisions is probably not top of mind. 
Although politics may not be as risky as skydiving per se, there are several political decisions that 
may have risky consequences and negative outcomes. For example, if citizens abstain in 
compulsory voting countries, they may receive fines from the government (Panagopoulos, 2008; 
Singh, 2011). Citizens who protest take the risk of being socially ostracized or physically harmed 
(Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). Even legislators run the risk of losing office by not 
following the preferences of their constituents (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002). It does not 
strain credulity to expect some members of the population to be more likely to incur the costs of 
abstaining, protesting, or ignoring constituents compared to others.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether political actors are influenced by 
their acceptance of risk. By political actors I mean citizens and elected elites. By risk acceptance 
I mean the degree to which an individual seeks out risky behaviors and uncertain outcomes 
(Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). The risk accepting are generally 
comfortable with uncertainty (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Levy, 2003) and more likely to challenge 
the status quo compared to other members of society (Kam, 2012). In the chapters that follow I 
argue individuals may be predisposed by their personality to make political decisions based on 
their individual acceptance of risk.  
Risk acceptance is a relatively new line of scholarly inquiry in political science. Kam 
(2012) finds evidence that risk-accepting citizens are more likely to attend political meetings, 
rallies, and sign petitions. However, she finds no evidence that risk acceptance influences the 
decision to vote. Even fewer studies consider how risk acceptance influences political elite 
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behavior. Rohde (1979), Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987), and Maestas et al. (2006) find 
that risk-accepting legislators are more likely to seek higher office. Other scholars consider how 
risk acceptance influences the decision making of state legislators (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). 
Besides these seminal pieces, few empirical studies and further theoretical advancements have 
been made by scholars regarding how risk acceptance influences the political behavior of citizens 
and elected elites.  
If risk acceptance influences how citizens participate in politics then it is reasonable that 
political elites, who are elected by citizens, are also influenced by their acceptance of risk. 
Likewise, if political elites and citizens are both influenced by risk acceptance, then risk acceptance 
may have a general effect on political decision making. By looking at citizen and legislator risk 
acceptance we can determine whether political actors are comfortable making risky decisions or if 
they prefer to choose the safe alternative.  
In the first half of the dissertation I use comparative analyses with American theoretical 
frameworks to predict participation. Why the comparative setting? The first half of the dissertation 
builds on Kam’s (2012) seminal analyses of risk acceptance and political participation. She finds 
no evidence that risk acceptance influences voting in the United States. In Chapter 4 I argue that 
the insignificant voting results are a function of the low costs of American elections. The potential 
costs that voters and abstainers may incur in American elections are very low (Downs, 1957). 
Indeed, while registration requirements in the United States add an additional barrier to voting not 
seen in other Western democracies, the act of voting on Election Day is relatively costless 
(Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 1978). Analyzing voting behavior at the international-level allows us 
to consider voting and abstaining in compulsory voting countries, where the costs and uncertainty 
are much higher. Abstaining in these countries may result in social, economic, or political costs.  
3 
 
By looking at voting in countries with higher costs, we may observe effects of risk acceptance on 
voting that previous scholars have not found. By looking at risk acceptance and voting at the 
international level we can explore institutional differences that do not vary within the United 
States. Further, we should expect that citizens in other democratic countries will act the same way 
as they do in the U.S. While risk acceptance rates do vary by country, the behavior of the risk 
accepting should only vary by the institutional changes in each country.1    
I also consider the effects of risk acceptance on protesting in a comparative setting by 
considering the differences between democratic and non-democratic countries. Kam (2012) finds 
very strong evidence that risk acceptance influences participation in American politics, but her 
analyses do not consider political protests and boycotts due to data limitations.2 By looking at 
protesting and boycotting at the international-level we can further Kam’s (2012) theoretical 
framework of risk acceptance and participation while at the same time consider additional relevant 
factors that may influence the decision to protest, such as a countries system of government.  
 
Psychophysical Risk-Return and Sensation Seeking Model: A Theory of Rational Choice 
There are two main theoretical frameworks that study risk behavior in economics and 
psychology. The first, known as the psychophysical risk-return model (Weber, Blais, and Betz, 
2002), assumes that individuals make decisions based on perceived benefits, perceived costs, and 
one’s disposition to tradeoff between the two. The rational choice model is often used in economic 
lab experiments to demonstrate differences in possibility and probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 
                                                          
1 See the World Values Survey for a breakdown of risk acceptance levels between countries.  
2 Kam (2012) finds that the risk accepting are more likely to attend political rallies and meetings, 
sign paper and online petitions, and hand out political literature to fellow citizens.  
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1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). This approach is similar to the seminal Downsian models of 
participation in political science (Downs, 1957).  
In these rational choice models, it assumed that humans make decisions to maximize their 
utility based on a defined number of choices. The preferences of individuals will determine the 
behavior, or outcome (Aldrich, 1993). In this scenario, the risk accepting make decisions to 
maximize gains and the risk averse make decisions to minimize losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). If we apply rational choice theory to risk taking, then we are 
assuming that individuals make decisions not because it is inherent in their personality, but because 
it is a conscious decision made in an attempt to maximize one’s utility outcome.  
Whereas rational choice scholars would argue that we can determine the behavior of the 
risk accepting by considering their preferences for risk taking, the sensation seeking model argues 
that the behavior of the risk accepting is biological. Sensation seeking is “a trait defined by the 
seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to 
take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman 1994, 
p. 27). Sensation seeking assumes that individuals are psychologically predisposed to make 
decisions. In other words, humans make risky decisions not because of a rational calculus between 
costs and benefits, but because risk taking is an innate part of their personality.   
The difference between the two theoretical approaches involves the cause, or preferences, 
of the decision making rather than the outcome of making the decision. In other words, how the 
individual came to making the decision rather than why the decision was made. The outcome for 
the risk accepting in the rational choice model is to maximize gains (utility). In the sensation 
seeking model it is to maximize sensations and experiences. I borrow from both schools of thought 
for the present project. I consider that although some humans may be predisposed to make risky 
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decisions, they will still make some decisions based on the perceived costs and benefits of an 
action.  
Citizen-Level Evidence: Section I 
  The purpose of the first half of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I add to theories of 
political participation. By political participation I mean citizens participating or abstaining in 
compulsory elections and political protests. In Chapter 4 I expand on compulsory voting theories 
by Panagopoulos (2008) and Singh (2011) by considering the risk acceptance of voters. 
Compulsory voting scholars argue that increased sanctions and enforcement of voting sanctions 
lead to an increase in voter turnout (Singh, 2011). While this is true in the aggregate, individual 
risk acceptance may influence the decision to vote or abstain in countries where voting is 
compulsory. Previous work finds little evidence that voting decisions are influenced by risk 
acceptance because the decision to vote is the fulfillment of civic duty (Kam, 2012). I consider the 
distinction between compulsory and voluntary voting systems. In compulsory voting systems the 
failure to vote may lead to financial or social sanctions that voluntary systems do not legislate. 
Because the risk accepting are more comfortable with uncertainty, enforced sanctions may reduce 
the effectiveness of compelling risk-accepting citizens to vote.  
Second, I look at how risk acceptance influences the decision to protest.  Kam (2012) finds 
strong evidence that the risk accepting are more likely to participate in politics because they find 
it exciting. She also argues that the risk accepting are more likely to participate in politics because 
they are more comfortable with uncertainty compared to low risk-accepting individuals. In Chapter 
5 I add to her theoretical framework by considering how the decision to protest may be influenced 
by risk acceptance and regime type. By regime type I mean democratic and non-democratic 
countries. Democracies provide more concessions than nondemocracies. Indeed, nondemocracies 
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are more likely to repress political protests. Therefore, the risk accepting may be more likely to 
protest compared to their less risk-accepting counterparts in non-democratic countries.  
I look at the relationship between risk acceptance, compulsory voting, and protesting for 
several reasons. First, Kam (2012) finds no evidence that risk acceptance influences the decision 
to vote. I argue that the lack of evidence may be attributable to the low cost and uncertainty of 
voting in U.S. elections. Conversely, when elections are compulsory the uncertainty and costs of 
abstaining are increased. Given that Kam (2012) only considers noncompulsory voting elections, 
compulsory elections may result in observable differences between high and low risk-accepting 
individuals. Second, although scholars have considered the role of risk acceptance on petitioning 
and attending political rallies, there is a lack of empirical evidence that risk acceptance influences 
more extreme and costly forms of political participation such as protesting, demonstrating, and 
boycotting. Likewise, there is little evidence to suggest systematic differences in protest behavior 
in democratic versus non-democratic countries between high and low risk-accepting individuals. 
Finally, by looking at different forms of political participation scholars will have a better 
understanding of the contextual effects of risk acceptance. For example, on the one hand the risk 
accepting may contribute to democratic principles by protesting, demonstrating, and boycotting at 
higher rates than low risk-accepting individuals. On the other hand, the risk accepting may subtract 
from democratic principles by abstaining from voting at higher rates in compulsory elections.  
 The findings support these assumptions. The highly risk accepting are less likely to vote in 
compulsory countries and more likely to protest in nondemocracies compared to those with low 
levels of risk acceptance. Risk acceptance decreases the probability of voting by 4.5 percentage 
points when voting is compulsory. Although compulsory voting affectively increases voter turnout 
in the aggregate, compulsory voting is not as effective of increasing turnout among the risk 
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accepting. This is a relatively modest substantive effect, but the findings do indicate risk 
acceptance influences voting behavior.  
 This has important theoretical implications for how scholars understand participation. If 
risk acceptance decreases the likelihood of participating when voting is compulsory, then 
compulsory voting may be less effective in countries with high risk-accepting populations. 
Likewise, countries would be wise to consider the types and extremity of sanctions to account for 
the risk accepting. Otherwise, full participation may remain elusive in these countries. I do not 
dispute the effectiveness of compulsory voting in this dissertation. Instead, I find evidence that the 
effects of compulsory voting may be weaker than previous scholars predict (Panagopoulos, 2008; 
Singh, 2011).  
The risk accepting are also much more likely to protest compared to their low risk-
accepting counterparts, an impressive factor of 2 to 1. The risk accepting report a much higher 
probability of demonstrating (47.6%) and boycotting (43.8%) compared to other members of 
society. This is a very strong substantive impact on protesting behavior. Given that protestors are 
often successful in achieving their intended goals (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Stephan & 
Chenoweth, 2008), the risk accepting may be the catalysts for political change in non-democratic 
countries. Non-democratic leaders in countries with large risk-accepting populations may grant 
more concessions to their citizens. By contrast, non-democratic leaders in countries with low risk-
accepting populations may be more repressive in their policies. Likewise, leaders in countries with 
low risk-accepting populations may prolong their tenure in government and do so with impunity.  
Together these findings suggest that we can be confident risk acceptance has a robust and 
important role in the decision-making process of political participation for citizens. Indeed, 
scholars would do well to consider future political participation studies with risk acceptance as a 
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predictive factor. While on the one hand risk acceptance may increase protest participation, it may 
also decrease voter turnout in compulsory countries.  
 
Elite-Level Evidence: Section II 
The purpose of the second half of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I develop a novel 
measure of risk acceptance for political elites in Chapter 3 because scholars currently do not have 
an additive index for political elites. A more reliable and valid way to measure risk acceptance 
would be to issue questionnaires to members of the United States House of Representatives. The 
costs and logistics of such a measure unfortunately are currently too great to draw empirical 
inferences. Instead, a common measure of legislator risk acceptance is Rohde’s (1979) binary 
measure. This measure is limited in two ways. First, individuals in the Rohde measure are not 
classified as low risk acceptors, rather individuals are only coded as having a preference for 
accepting risk (1) or otherwise (0). Second, a dichotomous variable does not reflect the distribution 
of risk acceptance in society and reduces the reliability of the risk acceptance measure.  
I address these deficiencies by creating a scaled measure of risk acceptance using predicted 
probabilities from a regression analysis that predicts the likelihood of a candidate winning their 
first race to congress. I argue that if the goal of running for office is to win then it is much riskier 
a proposition to run for a seat that you are unlikely to win than it is to run for a seat you are more 
likely to win. Legislators who are willing to run for a seat that they have a small probability of 
winning are much more accepting of a risky scenario than legislators who run for a seat with a 
high probability of winning. This measure provides scholars with a scaled range of risk acceptance 
rather than only a binary measure of acceptance of risk.  
The second purpose of Section II is to add to theories of risk acceptance and legislative 
decision making. By legislative decision making I mean the extent to which legislators are willing 
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to support the preferences of their political party and their constituents. I argue that there are 
contexts which may lead a legislator to deviate from their constituents’ preferences as well as from 
their party’s preferences. Deviation of party preferences can occur in many forms such as ideology, 
roll-call voting, or bill sponsorship. Constituent divergence is when legislators deviate from the 
preferences of their electoral district. Furthermore, deviation of constituent preferences occurs 
when legislators vote for bills that are ideologically dissimilar from their elected district. When 
legislators behave in a manner counterintuitive to the preferences of their political party or 
constituents, then they are considered ideologically divergent.  
In chapter 6 I argue that legislative decision making is a function of risk acceptance that 
leads to systematic changes in representation because risk-accepting legislators feel more 
empowered to represent their constituents in a manner that challenges the political status quo (Kam 
& Simas, 2012), while also making political decisions that are systematically different (Abramson, 
Aldrich, & Rhode, 1987) to low risk-accepting legislators. When legislators vote their conscience 
as trustees they are taking electoral risks by potentially challenging the preferences of voters. If 
legislative decision making is a factor of predispositions to risk, then the risk accepting should 
theoretically demonstrate personal preferences more in line with trustee theories of representation 
and the low risk accepting should demonstrate constituency preferences more in line with delegate 
theories of representation. This is especially true if the preferences of the legislator and 
constituency are in opposition. 
I identify three decisions where risk acceptance may influence legislative decision making 
in the 109th-111th United States Congresses. The first scenario is the willingness of a legislator to 
support his or her political party. This is often gauged as ideological divergence, or the gap between 
a legislator’s ideology and that of another political actor or constituent. A low risk-accepting 
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legislator may be more likely to support their party because lower support can result in losing 
access to leadership positions and resources that parties provide to help with reelection campaigns. 
Similarly, diverging from constituent preferences is a risk-accepting behavior with important 
potential costs. For example, when legislators vote against the preferences of constituents, voters 
may punish legislators with a lower vote share in the next election (Brady, Canes-Wrone & Cogan, 
2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Erikson & Wright, 2000). I argue that legislators will 
be cautious to deviate too far from their party or base.  
I also consider whether risk-accepting legislators deviate from the ideological mean of their 
party. Theories of citizen behavior suggest that the risk accepting are less ideologically 
conservative and less likely to identify as Republican compared to low risk-accepting individuals 
(Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2012). Therefore, higher levels of risk acceptance should result in 
lower ideological conservatism. Finally, are risk-accepting legislators more likely to shirk, or skip, 
roll-call votes? When they shirk their vote, legislators risk reprisal from constituents, as well as 
challengers who can use their absence to mount political attacks (Figlio, 2000; Wright, 1993), but 
voting the wrong way can lead to electoral defeat (Nyhan et al., 2012). Indeed, Mayhew (1974) 
argues that is always better for a legislator to be on the losing rather than the wrong side of a vote. 
I hypothesize that low risk-accepting legislators are more likely to shirk their votes and are less 
likely to diverge from the policy preferences of their party and their district compared to risk-
accepting legislators.  
I look at the relationship between risk acceptance and decision making in the United States 
House of Representatives for several reasons. First, theories of representation assume that 
legislators are hesitant to make risky decisions, but little empirical evidence has been offered by 
political scholars. If scholars want to make theoretical claims about the influence of risk on 
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legislative decision making, then we need empirical evidence and measures of individual risk 
acceptance for political elites. Given that scholars have ignored the role of individual risk 
acceptance for political elites, it is plausible that theories of representation are empirically 
inaccurate.  
I find that legislator behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives is based on risk 
acceptance –and not just experience or money-which influences legislative decision making in the 
U.S. Congress. Highly risk-accepting legislators follow the preferences of their district and are less 
ideologically conservative than low risk-accepting legislators. I find no evidence that the risk 
accepting ignore constituent preferences or shirk their vote differently than low risk-accepting 
legislators. Modern theories of representation, partisanship, and sub-constituencies are reinforced 
by the empirical evidence in this dissertation. Indeed, it seems that political decisions are a factor 
of risk acceptance. 
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2 I lay out a theoretical framework for 
why we should expect observable effects of risk acceptance on citizen participation and legislator 
representation. In Chapter 3 I review previous measures of risk acceptance in the literature. Data 
sources range from survey data at the international level and observational data at the American 
level. I demonstrate that measures of risk acceptance are neither uniform nor easily accessible. In 
Chapter 4 I analyze the effect of risk acceptance on voter turnout in compulsory voting countries. 
I find that high levels of risk acceptance decrease the likelihood of voting in compulsory voting 
countries. In Chapter 5 I consider how risk acceptance influences the decision to protest. I find that 
the highly risk accepting are twice as likely to protest compared to other members of society. In 
Chapter 6 I look at the role of risk acceptance on legislator decision making in the United States 
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House of Representatives. I find that the risk accepting are more likely to follow party preferences 
and they are less conservative than their colleagues in the House.  
Over the chapters that follow, I conclude that risk acceptance has a broad and substantive 
effect on the decision making of political actors. Not only are citizens influenced by their 
acceptance of risk, but political elites make decisions based on their personal risk acceptance.  The 
findings indicate that risk acceptance can predict whether citizens participate in politics and how 




CHAPTER 2.  A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RISK ACCEPTANCE   
For the purposes of this dissertation, I borrow from Kam’s (2012) definition of risk 
acceptance (p. 817). I define risk acceptance as the extent to which an individual is comfortable 
with uncertain outcomes and willing to challenge the status quo. Until recently, scholars often 
neglected the role of risk acceptance in politics. For example, Rohde (1979) finds that risk-
accepting legislators are more likely to seek higher office and Kam (2012) finds evidence that risk-
accepting citizens are more likely to attend political meetings, rallies, and sign petitions. However, 
since these seminal pieces, few empirical studies and theoretical advancements have been made 
by scholars regarding how risk acceptance influences political behavior. In this chapter I lay out a 
theoretical framework for how risk acceptance may influence political participation of citizens and 
representation by political elites. I build on Kam’s (2012) theory of risk acceptance and political 
participation and Rohde’s (1979) theory about risk acceptance and legislator decision making.  
I add to the literature by considering two political decisions where participation, or the lack 
thereof, may lead to increased uncertainty that challenges the status quo. The first decision is 
abstaining in compulsory voting countries. Kam (2012) finds no evidence that risk acceptance 
influences the decision to vote because, as she concludes, the act of voting in the United States 
provides participants with neither excitement nor uncertainty. In other words, individuals can 
abstain from U.S. elections without any legal or financial consequences. Indeed, Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1972) argue that voting in the United States, rather than abstaining, is the costlier 
activity. Therefore, rational individuals will abstain from American elections because the costs are 
higher than the benefits. Individuals vote not because they find it exciting, but because it fulfills 
their civic duty. However, abstaining in compulsory countries with enforced sanctions can result 
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in legal, financial, or social sanctions. These enforced sanctions increase the uncertainty of 
abstention compared to voluntary voting systems in countries such as the United States.  
The second decision is whether to protest. Protesting involves more severe costs than other 
traditional forms of political participation. Recent protests in the Arab Spring led to imprisonment, 
fines, and fatalities for individuals who participated and the racial protests in Ferguson and 
Baltimore ended with individuals arrested and injured, businesses suffering damage, and curfews 
enforced against the mass public. These outcomes would suggest that the consequences of 
protesting are more uncertain than other forms of political participation such as voting in the 
United States. I argue that risk-accepting individuals may be more likely to abstain from voting in 
compulsory elections but more likely to participate in political protests because they are more 
likely to challenge the status quo and are more comfortable with uncertain outcomes compared to 
the low risk accepting. 
I also consider how risk acceptance may influence political representation. If risk 
acceptance influences how citizens participate in politics (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2012), then 
it is reasonable that political elites, who are elected by citizens, are also influenced by their 
acceptance of risk. One of the few scholars to consider the risk acceptance of political actors, 
Rhode (1979), finds that risk-accepting legislators in the House of Representatives are more likely 
to pursue higher office. Scholars have given the role of risk acceptance on the political decision 
making of political actors relatively little consideration. Risk-accepting legislators may be more 
ambitious for higher office (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Rohde, 1979), but further 
evidence about legislative decision making is lacking.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider three political decisions that all legislators 
must make while in office: following the preferences of constituents or their party and whether to 
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shirk or skip their roll call vote. Each of these activities have potential consequences that can either 
end a legislator’s career or hinder their chance of promotion by leadership within their party.  
If political elites and citizens are both influenced by their acceptance of risk, then risk 
acceptance may have a general effect on political decision making. However, risk acceptance may 
not influence legislator decision making to the degree that it influences citizen participation given 
that political elites are influenced by many factors such as their party (Kingdon, 1989), institutional 
constructs (Carey et al., 2006), and personal preferences (Clinton, 2006). I argue that low risk-
accepting legislators may be more likely to follow the preferences of their political party and 
constituents, more likely to shirk their vote, and more likely to have conservative ideologies 
because they are less likely to challenge the status quo and are less comfortable with uncertain 
outcomes compared to the risk accepting. 
In this chapter I first look at the role of risk acceptance on political participation. By 
political participation I mean the extent to which risk acceptance influences voting in compulsory 
countries and protesting. In the second section I look at the role of risk acceptance on political 
representation. By political representation I mean the extent to which risk acceptance influences 
legislators to follow the preferences of their party and their constituents.  
 
Section I: Risk Acceptance and Political Participation 
Voting is arguably the foundation for successful democratic representation. Higher voter 
turnout leads to better communication between elected officials and constituents (Mansbridge, 
1994) while providing citizens with more political equality (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) and 
higher levels of democratic satisfaction (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais & Gélineau, 2007). Given 
the benefits of voting, it is surprising that voter participation is not higher in some countries. Some 
governments implement compulsory voting laws to respond to these anemic voting rates.  
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Compulsory voting involves a sanction, or punishment, and enforcement, or pursuing 
retribution, for not voting. Compulsory voting sanctions come in many forms. Economic sanctions 
include fines in Switzerland, Austria, Cyprus, Argentina, and Peru, and failure to pay the fines can 
result in prison sentences. The presence of substantial fines for abstaining makes it “paradoxical 
not to vote” (Singh, 2011, p. 96). Social sanctions include disenfranchisement in Belgium and 
Singapore, a loss of public services and goods in Peru, losing access to banks in Bolivia, and 
difficulty finding daycare in Italy and Mexico (IDEA 2001). Enforcement also varies by country. 
Some countries strictly enforce the sanctions while others are compulsory in name alone. The 
costlier the sanction and the more stringent the enforcement, the less likely individuals will abstain 
from voting (Panagopoulos, 2008; Fornos, Power, and Garand, 2004; Singh, 2011). Yet some 
citizens in countries where voting is compulsory are still willing to abstain from elections, even 
when faced with strong sanctions. How might risk acceptance influence the decision to vote in 
compulsory systems? 
The decision to vote may differ between the high and low risk accepting when voting is 
compulsory because the higher risk accepting have (1) lower levels of risk avoidance, meaning 
less concern about the potential uncertain negative consequences of not voting; and (2) may be 
more likely to challenge the status quo of fulfilling one’s civic duty. In other words, risk-accepting 
individuals may be more comfortable with the prospect of incurring the costs of abstention and 
more likely to believe they will avoid the sanction altogether.  
I look beyond U.S. elections and add to the literature by considering the effect of risk 
acceptance on voting in countries where the outcomes for abstaining are more uncertain because 
of compulsory sanctions, unlike countries such as the United States where voting is voluntary. 
While in democratic countries the status quo is to vote because it is the citizens duty (Downs, 
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1957), in compulsory voting countries the status quo is to fulfill one’s civic duty and avoid the 
sanction for abstaining. Sanctions and enforcement increase participation rates by an average of 
10 percentage points in compulsory voting systems because citizens want to avoid fines for 
abstention (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). However, the risk accepting are more comfortable 
with uncertainty. While the low risk accepting will vote to avoid the potential sanction, the risk 
accepting may be more willing to accept the uncertainty of abstaining and therefore more willing 
to accept the sanction. The threat of sanctions may be less effective of motivating turnout for risk-
accepting individuals. In Chapter 4 I test the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 4.1: There is a 
negative relationship between risk acceptance and turnout in compulsory voting countries. 
 
Protest Participation 
In this section I consider the role of risk acceptance on protest participation and build on 
the logic from compulsory voting. The probability that an individual will bring about change to 
the political system is miniscule and an established paradox in the literature (Aldrich, 1993; 
Downs, 1957). This sentiment has led protest scholars to argue that participation is a factor of 
dissatisfaction or alienation with traditional representative channels such as voting or contacting 
political elites (Gurr, 1970), often because these individuals lack other resources to bring about 
political change (Tarrow, 1995). Political change can only occur when individuals are willing to 
participate in politics, and many often do so out of a sense of civic pride or duty (Downs, 1957). 
Recent literature suggests that protests are a function of civic expression, or simply another means 
to a political end (Inglehart, 1977; 1997), and scholars argue that individuals participate in protests 
to have their voices heard by the government (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005).  
Protests create untraditional channels of communication with political elites that are often 
harder to ignore than more traditional forms of participation. For example, protests allow citizens 
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to convey important policy preferences to Members of Parliament (Hooghe & Marien, 2014), 
protests increase legitimacy to political elites (Gilljam, Persson, & Karlsson, 2012), and protests 
communicate desires for social justice (Gillion, 2012). When individuals participate in these 
untraditional channels of communication they are often effective in bringing about policy and other 
systemic changes (Gamson, 1990; Rochon & Mazmamian, 1993; Schumaker, 1975). 
For citizens to have successful communication with political elites using protests, 
individuals may incur greater costs and be exposed to greater levels of uncertainty than traditional 
methods of political participation.  The consequences of participating in protests are much greater 
than traditional methods of participation such as voting or contacting representatives. When 
individuals participate in protests they may risk uncertain legal and financial sanctions for 
themselves and the surrounding community. The recent protests in Ferguson and Baltimore in the 
United States and the Arab Spring in the Middle East are examples of the negative consequences 
that can occur in extreme situations. Several of the recent global protests have ended with the loss 
of life. This is not to suggest that all protests are dangerous or uncertain. However, in many 
circumstances protests are not for the faint-of-heart. Protests can involve public displays of 
emotion that are oftentimes loud and motivated by anger and typically involve large groups of 
people.  
Risk acceptance is the degree to which individuals seek out risky behaviors or uncertain 
outcomes. Low risk-accepting individuals prefer to avoid activities with potential negative 
consequences and they seek higher levels of security and certainty compared to those who are risk 
accepting (Neumann & Politser, 1992). Given that protesting is a riskier activity with greater 
uncertainty and lower levels of security than voting, it is reasonable that the low risk accepting 
may likely to protest compared to high risk-accepting individuals. In addition to being more 
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comfortable with uncertain outcomes, risk-accepting individuals are also more likely to pursue 
exciting and novel activities (Zuckerman, 1979; 2007). Kam (2012) finds that risk acceptance has 
a general effect on political participation due to “novelty seeking and excitement seeking” (817). 
She concludes that general political activities are exciting and entice risk-accepting individuals to 
participate. The excitement and uncertainty of protests may also make the risk accepting more 
likely to participate compared to other members of society.  
 
Non-democratic Protests 
Protestors achieve their goals through large masses imposing threats on the government by 
disrupting the political environment to change the status quo (DeNardo, 1985; Piven & Cloward, 
1977). Governments have four potential responses to these attempts: (1) they can concede to the 
demands of challengers without repression, (2) repress the challengers without concessions, (3) 
tolerate the challenge without concession or repression, or (4) repress the challenges but grant 
concessions (Franklin, 2009). Concessions are achieved when governments concede to the 
demands and goals of the participants. Repressions are the negative consequences that 
governments enact in response to protesters.  
The uncertainty of achieving concessions or receiving repression are not equal across 
political systems. The consequences of protesting in non-democratic countries are more severe 
than in established democracies because elected political elites are constrained by democratic 
principles that unelected leaders do not follow. Democratic leaders are restrained from repression 
due to future political backlash (Gartner & Regan, 1996). Political scholars find strong evidence 
to suggest that higher levels of democracy leads to lower levels of political repression and higher 
levels of government concession (Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 1991; Poe & Tate, 1994). This 
would suggest that protesting in non-democratic countries has much higher uncertainty compared 
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to democracies for two reasons. First, non-democratic leaders are less likely to grant concessions 
to citizens compared to democracies. Second, non-democratic governments are more likely to 
implement repression towards participating citizens compared to democracies. Therefore, in non-
democratic countries, not only does protesting involve higher potential for failure, but the failure 
might also result in more negative consequences than what existed prior to the movement.   
I test the following hypotheses in Chapter 5 regarding the extent to which risk-accepting 
individuals will protest in nondemocracies compared to low risk-accepting individuals. Hypothesis 
5.1: There is a positive relationship between risk acceptance and protest activity in non-democratic 
countries. Hypothesis 5.2: Risk acceptance has a weaker positive relationship on protest activity 
in democratic countries. 
 
Section II: Risk Acceptance and Political Representation 
 In this section I consider the extent to which legislators are willing to support the 
preferences of their political party and their constituents. The concepts and causal mechanisms are 
similar for political elites and the mass public. As the previous sections demonstrated, risk 
acceptance is the extent to which one is willing to challenge the status quo and accept uncertain 
outcomes. Given that risk acceptance influences how citizens participate in politics it is reasonable 
that political elites, who are elected by citizens, are also influenced by their acceptance of risk. By 
considering individual risk acceptance this will give scholars a better understanding of why some 
legislators make hazardous political decisions. If legislative decision making is a function of risk 
acceptance then risk-accepting legislators may be more likely to challenge the political status quo 
(Kam & Simas, 2012) while also making political decisions that are systematically different to low 




I consider three choices where risky decision making may lead to electoral defeat for 
legislators. The first choice is aligning with the preferences of the party. I expect low risk-accepting 
legislators may be more likely to support their party compared to the high risk accepting because 
parties provide leadership positions and resources that help with reelection campaigns (Cox & 
McCubbins, 1993; Heberlig, Hetherington, & Larson, 2006). In this context, ignoring the party is 
a challenge to the status quo and an increase in the uncertainty of reelection.  
The second choice is aligning with the preferences of constituents. I expect that low risk-
accepting legislators may be more likely to follow the preferences of constituents compared to the 
risk accepting because ignoring constituent preferences may result in a lower vote share in the next 
election (Brady, Canes-Wrone & Cogan, 2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Erikson & 
Wright, 2000). In this context, ignoring the preferences of constituents results in a challenge to the 
status quo and increases the uncertainty of reelection.  
The third choice is shirking their roll-call vote. I expect that low risk-accepting legislators 
may be more likely to shirk, or skip, roll-call votes compared to the risk accepting. Although 
skipping votes may lead to reprisals from constituents and challengers may use their absence to 
mount political attacks (Figlio, 2000; Wright, 1993), legislators need shielding from controversial 
votes because even one vote out of step with constituents can end a legislator’s career (Nyhan et 
al., 2012). In this context, shirking roll-call votes maintains the status quo and decreases the 
uncertainty of reelection. These three choices are similar in that they all involve a degree of risk, 
have the potential to challenge the status quo, and may increase the uncertainty of outcomes. 
Legislators may be punished for challenging the status quo if they make the wrong decision. In the 





Legislators make decisions every day in office. Sometimes they listen to the opinions of 
their constituents while other times they follow the preferences of interest groups, party leaders, 
or their self (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Kingdon, 1989; Nyhan et al., 2012). Sometimes the 
preferences of these factions are aligned, other times they are in opposition. A legislator must 
decide which factions to lend their support and weigh the potential negative consequences of 
making the wrong decision with the potential benefits of making the right decision (Canes-Wrone, 
Brady, & Cogan, 2002).  
Literature suggests that legislators are influenced by their party (Kingdon, 1989; Matthews 
& Stimson, 1975; Ray, 1982; Songer et al., 1986), unsurprising given that parties provide several 
benefits that are hard for legislators to ignore. Parties shield legislators from their constituents on 
controversial votes (Aldrich & Rohde, 1997), provide media and campaign management assistance 
(Adamany, 1984; Herrnson, 1986; 1987), and money (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000; Leyden & 
Borrelli, 1990; Parker, 2008). Legislators need money because political campaigns are more 
expensive and uncertain than in the past. The greater uncertainty and cost of elections in turn makes 
more financial resources from the party a necessity to stay in office (Jacobson, 2004). Parties also 
provide numerous institutional organizations to expedite fundraising from party leaders (Wright, 
2000) and they increase redistributed funds from fellow legislators (Bedlington & Malbin, 2003; 
Heberlig & Larson, 2006) to combat the higher costs and uncertainty of elections.  
Parties provide help to their members beyond campaign contributions. Following the party 
may lead to attaining higher office or promotion to leadership positions (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & 
Cogan, 2002; Heberlig, Hetherington, & Larson, 2006; Smith, 2000). Simply put, parties are more 
likely to reward legislators with leadership positions that are more loyal to party interests (Cox & 
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McCubbins, 1993). Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2006) find that party leaders are more 
likely to reward legislators that are “ideologically like-minded members” rather than “those of 
ideologically dissimilar members” (p. 992). The evidence of legislator long-term career benefits 
by following the preferences of their party is quite striking. For example, legislators will 
sometimes follow the preferences of their party even when there is a threat of losing office 
(Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Rohde, 1991; Snyder & Groseclose, 2000). Given these 
benefits, why would legislators stray from the preferences of their party?  
Following the party in some ways may decrease electoral uncertainty but it can also lead 
to unease with constituents. For example, “voters are not punishing elected representatives for 
being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan” (Carson et al., 2010, p. 598).  
Although other factions may be able to withdraw or lend vital resources for reelection, constituents 
ultimately have the unique power to decide who stays in office and who goes. Indeed, voting out 
of step with voters can have catastrophic consequences that ends a legislator’s career (Canes-
Wrone et al., 2002; Carson et al., 2010). Ultimately, legislators may stray from the preferences of 
their party to avoid electoral defeat (Hutchings, 2003). Because the risk accepting are more 
comfortable with uncertainty and more likely to challenge the status quo, we should expect their 
decision making to vary compared to the low risk accepting. This leads to the first hypothesis for 
Chapter 6. Hypothesis 6.1: There is a positive relationship between risk acceptance and ignoring 
party preferences. 
 
Risk Acceptance and Ideology 
 I also consider how a legislator’s ideology may influence their decision to follow party 
preferences. Are risk-accepting legislators less conservative than their party mean? Previous 
studies find the risk accepting are less likely to identify as Republicans and have a conservative 
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political ideology (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2010). Although these studies focus on citizen 
ideology, we should expect a similar relationship for members of Congress. Under this theoretical 
framework we should expect highly risk-accepting legislators to be less ideologically conservative 
than their risk-accepting counterparts. This may explain why ideological moderates are less likely 
to run for office in the modern Congress (Thomsen, 2014). This leads to the second hypothesis for 




Downs’ (1957) spatial theory suggests that a voter has an ideal policy preference point and 
policies that are further from this preference point are less preferred than policies closer to the ideal 
point. When legislators move further from the preference point of the median district voter they 
are taking electoral risks because voters will punish legislators who ignore their preferences 
(Abramowitz, 1988; Johannes & McAdams, 1981; McAdams & Johannes, 1987; 1988; Whitby & 
Bledsoe, 1986). Therefore, it does not strain credulity that legislators are going to follow the 
preferences of their district to reduce their reelection uncertainty. Indeed, incumbents often lose 
office if they deviate too far from the preferences of their constituents (Miller & Stokes, 1963). 
This relationship is further exaggerated when the issues are salient. Legislators will pay 
particularly close attention to the preferences of their constituents on highly salient votes (Bianco, 
1994; Jackson & Kingdon, 1992; Matthews & Stimson, 1975) because even one vote out of touch 
with constituents can end a legislator’s career (Nyhan et al., 2012). Legislators who are willing to 
vote out of step with their district are accepting greater potential for electoral defeat. And yet some 
legislators are willing to ignore the preferences of their constituents. Why do legislators stray from 
the preferences of their district?  
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It may seem counterintuitive for legislators to stray from the preferences of the district 
given the power of constituents to choose who stays and who leaves office. However, legislators 
do not always follow the preferences of their district. This indicates that there are determinants of 
voting behavior other than electoral consequences (Kingdon, 1989), such as personal (Bianco, 
Spence, & Wilkerson, 1996) or party preferences (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Cox & Poole, 2001). 
The trustee-delegate dichotomy argues that some districts entrust their legislator to make decisions 
on their behalf with little concern about electoral accountability (Fearon, 1999). Trustees are given 
relatively strong autonomy to make decisions for their district. In turn, legislators may follow the 
preferences of other factions. Legislators are also more likely to stray from the preferences of their 
district when they are no longer concerned with reelection (Herrick et al., 1994). For example, 
Carey et al. (2006) find that “term-limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in 
their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns” (p. 105). Other scholars find that 
legislators who leave office are more likely to follow the preferences of other political actors 
(Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000). Without the threat of reelection scholars may stray from the 
preferences of their district.  
How might risk acceptance influence legislator decisions to follow the preferences of 
constituents? The risk accepting are comfortable with uncertainty. When legislators ignore the 
preferences of their constituents they increase the uncertainty of reelection (Canes-Wrone, Brady, 
& Cogan, 2002). Therefore, we should expect low risk-accepting legislators to follow the 
preferences of their constituents because they do not want to increase the uncertainty of electoral 
defeat. On the other hand, the risk accepting may be less inclined to follow their constituents in 
favor of other political actors. This is not to suggest that risk-accepting legislators ignore 
constituent preferences frivolously. Rather, the risk accepting may be more comfortable with the 
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uncertain negative consequences of ignoring constituent preferences compared to the low risk 
accepting. Or, the risk accepting may be more inclined to challenge the status quo and follow the 
preferences of political actors other than their constituents compared to the low risk accepting. 
This leads to the third hypothesis for Chapter 6. Hypothesis 6.3: There is a positive relationship 
between risk acceptance and ignoring district preferences. 
 
Legislative Shirking 
 Some legislators rarely miss a roll call vote while a select few are hardly ever present. 
Legislators are tasked with committee assignments, dealing with the press, and constituent requests 
among many other responsibilities daily. Most members of Congress vote on almost all roll calls 
(Cohen & Noll, 1991), but campaigning and dealing with the demands of political actors occupies 
a legislator’s time that can potentially detract from roll call voting. Indeed, party leaders are more 
likely to miss votes compared to the rank-and-file members (Rothenberg & Sanders, 1999), 
presumably because they have more responsibilities than the rank-and-file, or they only vote on 
very important matters. Why do legislators shirk their vote?  
 Scholars argue that legislators are more likely to shirk their vote when constituents have 
opposing views on issues or when legislators are trying to maintain their chances of reelection 
(Fiorina, 1974; Mayhew, 1974). Part of Mayhew’s (1974a) electoral connection hypothesis is that 
it is better for legislators to be on the losing side of a vote rather than taking the wrong position on 
a vote. In other words, sometimes vote shirking is safer than position taking. This is not to suggest 
that vote shirking increases reelection certainty. Shirking can also lead to representative issues 
with constituents who feel they are not represented. Indeed, constituents respond negatively to vote 
shirking (Wright, 1993).  
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 How might risk acceptance influence legislator decisions to shirk their vote? On the one 
hand, we should expect low risk-accepting legislators not to shirk their vote because of the 
potential electoral consequences and attacks by challengers that may increase electoral uncertainty. 
On the other hand, legislators may need to shirk their vote when the preferences of the district are 
unknown. I argue that risk-accepting legislators are less likely to shirk their vote to safeguard 
against controversial votes that constituents may find unfavorable. Thus, the less risky behavior is 
to abstain from roll call votes to reduce electoral consequences when the preferences of the district 
are unknown, or the vote is controversial. Therefore, we should expect risk-accepting legislators 
to shirk their votes at lower rates than low risk-accepting legislators. This leads to the final 
hypothesis for Chapter 6. Hypothesis 6.4: There is a negative relationship between risk acceptance 






Table 2.1 Proposed Hypotheses 
 
HYPOTHESES                 HYPOTHESIZED    RISK      
                DIRECTION 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: There is a negative relationship between    (-)         Sanctions 
risk acceptance and turnout in compulsory voting countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: There is a positive relationship between    (+)       Repression 
risk acceptance and protest activity in non-democratic countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Risk acceptance has a weaker positive    (+)       Repression 
relationship on protest activity in democratic countries. 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: There is a positive relationship between    (+)          Electoral 
risk acceptance and ignoring party preferences.          Uncertainty 
 
Hypothesis 6.2: There is a negative relationship between    (-)                 Ideology 
risk acceptance and ideological conservatism. 
 
Hypothesis 6.3: There is a positive relationship between    (+)          Electoral 
risk acceptance and ignoring district preferences.          Uncertainty 
 
Hypothesis 6.4: There is a negative relationship between    (-)          Electoral 





 These hypotheses will enhance scholarly understanding of important questions regarding 
participation and representation. Perhaps citizens are motivated and affected by risk acceptance 
differently than political elites. Consider for example on the one hand, the risk accepting may 
contribute to a better represented constituency and overall healthier democracy by protesting 
perceived political and social injustices. On the other hand, the risk accepting may harm 
democratic principles by abstaining from voting more than the low risk accepting.  
 Scholars find strong evidence that compulsory voting increases voter turnout 
(Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). While this may be true in the aggregate, if the risk accepting 
are less likely to vote in compulsory systems, then compulsory voting laws may be less effective 
in countries with large risk-accepting populations. Some countries have a larger risk-accepting 
population than others. Consider that countries such as the Netherlands (64.0), Japan (64.4), and 
Egypt, (67.2) have populations whose risk acceptance levels are at least one standard deviation 
above the risk acceptance mean. Therefore, compulsory voting laws may be less effective in the 
Netherlands, Japan, and Egypt. There are also cultural considerations that come into play when 
making comparisons at the international level. Some countries may have higher voter turnout due 
to social or cultural norms that encourage participation. Likewise, culture may influence the 
interpretation of risk altogether. Whereas some countries may find taking financial risks a risk-
accepting activity, others may consider small fines for abstention to be inconsequential.   
If low risk-accepting individuals are less likely to protest, then countries with a small risk-
accepting population may be more susceptible to government overreach. By contrast, countries 
with large risk-accepting populations may be more likely to grant concessions to their citizens. 
Governments with small risk-accepting populations may grant fewer concessions to their citizens, 
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instead enacting more repressive policies. In turn this may lead to less democratic principles. 
Consider that large segments of the Indonesian (40.2), Indian (44.7), and Ghana (51.8) populations 
have risk acceptance levels that are at least one standard deviation below the risk acceptance mean. 
Therefore, the governments of Indonesia, India, and Ghana may be less likely to grant political 
concessions compared to other more risk-accepting countries. These are potentially important 
theoretical implications given that protests lead to political change and allow for citizens to express 
their policy preferences to political elites (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Hooghe & Marien, 2014; 
Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), while voting provides citizens with more political equality 
(Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) and leads to higher levels of democratic satisfaction (Anderson et 
al., 2005; Blais & Gélineau, 2007).  
If democracy is the normatively preferred system of government, then risk acceptance may 
help scholars better understand why citizens participate or abstain from politics. This in turn 
changes the political landscape because the balance of power is susceptible to which factions are 
present and which are absent. If the risk accepting are more, or less, likely to abstain from politics, 
then political elites must tailor their message and behavior so that it provides the highest level of 
support for their preferences over the opposition. Ultimately, who wins office determines the 
policies enacted by the government and the direction of society. Therefore, the potential findings 
will also enhance scholarly understanding of political elites and representation.  
A common foundation of representative democracy is that citizens elect leaders to 
represent their concerns. If, however, the risk accepting are more likely to ignore the preferences 
of their constituents then risk acceptance may influence the representative nature of government. 
This in turn may lead to lower vote shares in future elections (Hogan, 2008) or more elite 
polarization and political conflict. Additionally, if legislators are more likely to shirk their vote 
31 
 
when leaving office, then risk acceptance may help scholars better predict which political elites 
are more likely to be citizen politicians and which are more likely to be professional politicians. 
On a more basic level risk acceptance may influence the policy positions of legislators. If 
legislators are influenced by their acceptance of risk, then policy outcomes might be susceptible 
to psychological factors such as risk in addition to political factors such as party or ideology.  
Because all human decisions involve a degree of risk, and political decisions have 
potentially severe consequences when those decisions are made in error, it is important for scholars 
to better understand the role that risk acceptance has on political decision making for the mass 
public and political elites. Together, these hypotheses will help scholars better understand why 
some individuals are more willing to make systematically hazardous political decisions and why 
some individuals prefer to challenge the status quo rather than prefer a more guaranteed and safer 





CHAPTER 3. MEASURING RISK ACCEPTANCE  
 
The purpose of the present chapter is two-fold.  First, I review previous measures of risk 
acceptance for citizens and political elites. Measures of risk acceptance for the mass public have 
increased in quality and quantity because of survey instruments. I follow this synthesis of previous 
literature by discussing the measure of citizen risk acceptance I use in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
The World Values Survey provides a strong measure of risk acceptance that allows us to be 
confident in the results for the mass public.  
The second purpose of Chapter 3 provides a greater challenge to scholars. At issue is how 
to measure risk acceptance for political elites at the federal level, which is currently lacking in the 
literature while also increasing measurement error. Scholars can increase reliability and validity 
with self-reported questionnaires to members of congress. However, unfortunately current such 
measures do not exist because as Rohde (1979) states, the costs “would be great and such a course 
would be impossible with the timespan with which we are dealing” (p. 14). Due to the lack of 
survey data, scholars currently use Rohde’s (1979) binary measure of risk acceptance for 
legislators at the federal level. Rohde’s proxy measure of risk acceptance further decreases validity 
and reliability for scholars. This is not to suggest that Rohde’s measure of risk acceptance is 
invalid. Maestas and Pollock (2010) find that single measures of risk acceptance have strong levels 
of validity and reliability. However, scholars can improve the reliability and validity of risk 
acceptance using multiple item indices. 
I lay out a theoretical argument for how and why the present measure of risk acceptance is 
valid and reliable. Throughout the second half of Chapter 3 I argue legislators who run for office 
when they have little chance of winning are taking much greater risks than legislators who have a 
good chance of winning. I do this by estimating the probability of legislators winning their first 
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election to the U.S. House. Legislators with a high probability of losing are considered to have a 
high level of risk acceptance. I include multiple tests of validity and reliability with strong results. 
Although the risk acceptance measure in the present dissertation for political elites is a proxy 
measure of risk, the strong correlations provided below provide scholars with a more accurate and 
reliable measure than previously established in the literature.  
 
Previous Measures of Risk Acceptance 
Measures of risk acceptance vary in the literature depending on the research question 
scholars ask. Scholars who study citizen behavior often use several-item scaled indexes from 
survey questionnaires (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2010; Kam & Simas, 2012). Kam (2012) 
measures risk acceptance as a 7-item index with questions such as “I like new and exciting 
experiences, even if I have to break the rules”, “I prefer friends who are exciting and 
unpredictable”, and “In general, how easy or difficult is it for you to accept taking risks?” 
Individuals who most strongly agree with these questions are highly risk accepting. Several-item 
indexes are most desirable because they increase the validity and reliability of the risk acceptance 
measure. Fortunately, direct citizen risk acceptance measures are becoming more common in large 
surveys. The same cannot be said for political elites.  
Scholars tend to use financial measures of risk acceptance for political elites when self-
reported measures of risk are unavailable. For example, Maestas et al. (2006) measure risk 
acceptance as the comfort level of state legislators making financial or career risky decisions. State 
legislators who report that they are "very comfortable" or "somewhat comfortable" making risky 
financial or career decisions are considered risk accepting (pg. 201). This index of risk acceptance 
increases measurement error and reduces the validity and reliability of risk acceptance because 
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rather than being a direct measure of self-reported preferences, risk acceptance begins to resemble 
a proxy measure of risk.  
Rohde’s (1979) binary measure of risk acceptance defines risk-accepting legislators as 
those who ran for political office against an incumbent in their first election to Congress or if 
candidates ran in seats that were historically occupied by members of the opposite party, defined 
as 57% of the vote or more. The logic behind using this measure of risk acceptance is 
straightforward, “the risk of running against an incumbent is a good deal greater than the risk of 
running if there is no incumbent in the race” (Rohde, 1979, p. 8). This measure is limited in that 
only individuals who are coded a 1 are classified as having a risk preference. This is problematic 
because as Rohde (1979) acknowledges “we do not know that they would not have run if the 
previous incumbent had been running” and therefore we only determine their level of risk 
acceptance (p. 15). A dichotomous variable also does not reflect the distribution of risk acceptance 
in society and reduces the reliability of the risk acceptance measure.  
 
A Measure of Risk Acceptance for Citizen Voting and Protesting 
 
 The World Values Survey asks citizens self-reported measures of risk acceptance at the 
international level. I model risk acceptance in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 after several scholars who 
use comparable questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) and other large surveys to 
measure risk acceptance of citizens (Berinsky & Lewis, 2007; Freese, 2004; Hoyle et al., 2002; 
Kam, 2012; Miller, 2000; Morgenstern & Zechmeister, 2001). The WVS asks respondents whether 
“Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.” Individuals who 
most strongly agree with this question are considered risk accepting. Therefore, Risk Acceptance 
is measured using a 6-point scale from one question in the WVS that ranges from 1-6, where 1 is 
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low risk acceptance and 6 is high risk acceptance. Although I only include one measure of risk 
acceptance in the model, Maestas and Pollock (2010) demonstrate that single-item measures of 
risk are valid and reliable.3 I use this measure of risk acceptance for the analysis of compulsory 
voting and protesting.  
 The structural correlates of Risk Acceptance with Age (-.25, p< .001), Sex (-.13, p< .001), 
and Education (.08, p< .001) are statistically significant and in the expected direction for the 
compulsory voting analysis in Chapter 4. Older individuals and women are less accepting of risk 
but higher educated individuals are more likely to take risks (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; 
Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). The structural correlates of Risk Acceptance with Age (-.23, p< 
.001), Sex (-.13, p< .001), and Education (.07, p< .001) are also statistically significant and in the 
expected direction for the protesting analysis in Chapter 5.  
 We can further test the reliability and validity of Risk Acceptance by correlating it with 
voter turnout. An important part of Kam’s (2012) conclusion is that risk acceptance has no effect 
on voter turnout because, as she states, “Given that voting is most characterized as fulfillment of 
duty, and given that duty least motivates risk seekers, we can see why, in the relationship between 
risk attitudes and political participation, the act of voting is the exception, not the rule” (p. 829). 
Therefore, we should find a null result between Risk Acceptance and Voting. I include a binary 
logit regression of risk acceptance on voting and signing petitions in Table 3.1 below.4 Risk 
Acceptance is neither statistically significant for Voting (-0.0362, p= 0.14) nor Petitioning (-
                                                          
3 See: Maestas, Cherie D and Pollock, William M., Measuring Generalized Risk Orientation with 
a Single Survey Item (May 3, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599867 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1599867. 
4 I include signing petitions as a proxy for other forms of participation. Kam (2012) finds strong 
evidence that risk acceptance influences political participation such as attending rallies and 
meetings, signing paper petitions, and influencing others to vote.  
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0.0021, p=0.89). These results suggest we can be confident that Risk Acceptance provides scholars 
with a scaled measure of risk acceptance at the international level for the mass public that is valid 




Table 3.1   Binary Logit of The Effect of Risk Acceptance on Voting and  
      Petitioning 2006-2008 
__________________________________________________________________ 
                   Voting           Petitioning  
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance    -0.0362  -0.0047   
     (0.0217)  (0.0312)  
Social Structure 
Age       0.0369***   0.0005   
     (0.0040)  (0.0042)  
Sex     -0.0950    0.0055   
     (0.0564)  (0.0572)  
Education     0.6212    0.0860*  
     (0.0264)  (0.0384)  
Employment     0.6212***    0.2084   
     (0.0801)  (0.1262)  
Religiosity     0.0982***  -0.0671   
     (0.0259)  (0.0416)  
Motivational Attitudes 
Political Interest    0.3858***   0.3240***  
     (0.0547)   (0.0855)  
Systems Support 
Government Confidence   0.1438**  -0.2399*    
     (0.0523)  (0.1217) 
Social Trust     0.1480    0.2102  
     (0.1079)  (0.1552) 
Political Behavior 
Party Member     0.7079***   0.2905  
     (0.1268)  (0.1517) 
Labor Member     0.1910*   0.4846*** 
     (0.0887)  (0.1250) 
 
Constant     -1.1444   -0.2761  
 
N      33,011    33,576  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the binary logit regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses.  




A New Measure of Risk Acceptance for Political Elites 
I expand Rohde’s (1979) reasoning to create a measure of legislator risk acceptance. I argue 
that, if the goal of running for office is to win, then running for a seat that you are likely to lose is 
riskier than running for a seat you are likely to win. I use this simple logic for the current risk 
measure. Legislators who are willing to run for a seat that they have a small probability of winning 
are much more accepting of risk than legislators who run for a seat with a high probability of 
winning. To that end, I define risk acceptance as the extent to which legislators are willing to run 
for seats they are likely to lose. Therefore, individuals with a high probability of losing are 
considered more risk accepting than those with a high probability of winning. The current measure 
of risk acceptance is intended to estimate a legislator’s electoral chance. Other factors that predict 
a legislator’s chance of winning may not be included in the present analysis. However, it should 
logically follow that individuals who run when the likelihood of winning is low are more accepting 
of risk than individuals who run when the likelihood of winning is high. 
To generate the predictive values of winning office I use a binary logistic regression for 
the two highest vote getters in their first election to Congress from 1970 through 2010 using a data 
set that was graciously provided by Gary Jacobson.5 The purpose of the generated predicted values 
is to estimate the probability of winning office. The literature identifies several important factors 
that explain why candidates win office such as the prior presidential vote, prior incumbent district 
vote, whether they’re facing an incumbent or an open seat, money spent campaigning, and the 
presence of a primary challenge (Born, 1981; Hogan, 2008; Jacobson, 2006).  
Expenditures are the amount of money spent campaigning in 2007 real dollars by each 
candidate. I also include year and region dummy variables to provide a more accurate electoral 
                                                          
5 This excludes redistricted and unchallenged seats. 
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landscape to account for the differences between years and regions. I include a dummy variable 
for Southern Democrats in 1970 and 1974 to account for evolving party identification.6  
I include a control variable to account for legislators who ran in safe districts with a high 
probability of winning the general election but who may have faced strong competition in the 
primary. In these districts the primary election is the main election to determine the winner. 
Without controlling for the primary election, the probability of winning the seat in these races 
would be over reported. Born (1981) finds that candidates who receive a higher percentage of the 
primary vote are more likely to win in the general election.  
Finally, I account for “strategic behavior” candidates who are more likely to run in the 
primary, even though their chances of winning the general election are minimal, because these 
candidates are more likely to be their party’s nominee since fewer candidates enter the primary 
(Banks & Kiewiet, 1989).7 By including primary vote totals, the measure provides a strong 
representation of a candidate’s chance of winning. The measure of risk acceptance I propose is 
still limited because, like Rohde (1979), I do not know if a candidate would run in a previous 
election if given the opportunity. However, even though methodologically the variance in the risk 
measure may not determine the full range of risk acceptance, logically one is a much greater risk 
taker if their probability of winning office is only 0.36% compared to 99.88%. Formally, I estimate 




                                                          
6 None of the legislators in the proceeding analyses fall into this category. Only Charles Rangel 
and C. W. Bill Young ran in elections prior to 1974.  
7 They find that only ~5% of candidates fall into this “strategic behavior” category.  
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Democratic Win = β0 + β1 Prior Democrat Presidential Vote (In District Coded by Democrat) +  
β2 Prior District Vote (Coded by Party) + β3 Democrat Incumbent + β4 Democrat Open 
Seat + β5 Expenditures + β6 Primary Vote Percent + β7 Southern Democrat + β8 Northeast 
+ β9 West + β10 Midwest + β11 South + β12 Year… + ε  
 
Excluding uncontested and redistricted seats from 1970 to 2010, the sample yields 9,623 
observations.8 The results for the regression model are in Table 3.2. Prior Democrat Presidential 
Vote (b=0.12, p<.001), Prior District Vote (b= 0.05, p<.001), Democrat Incumbent (b= 2.76, p< 
.001), Democrat Open Seat (b= 2.06, p< .001), Expenditures (b= 3.34e-07, p <.001), Primary Vote 
Percent (b= 0.004, p< .01), and Southern Democrat (b= 4.02, p< .001) reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance.  
Next, I estimate the probability of winning for each legislator who faced a challenger in 
the 109th through the 111th Congresses using the results from Table 3.2.9 Because the default values 
are the probability of a Democrat winning office, we must convert the values for Republicans. I 
do this by measuring the absolute value of the Democrats’ predicted probabilities of winning from 
100. The predicted values are converted so that Risk Acceptance is congruent between Republicans 
and Democrats. We must also reverse code the measure from the probability of winning to the 
probability of losing. This is also done by measuring the absolute value of winning from 100 for 
                                                          
8 Although I exclude all current uncontested seats from the model, it is possible that the prior 
vote percentage in the district was 100% and is still included to determine the safety of the 
district for the party from the previous election. Candidates who received 100% of their primary 
election are included.  
9 This excludes races where two incumbents challenged one another because of redistricting. 
This also excludes races where the incumbent was unchallenged, defined as receiving 100% of 
the vote. In the case of an unchallenged district, the probability of a challenger winning is 
automatically 0 because there was no challenge. Therefore, only challenged races are included in 
the analysis.  
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all legislators. Therefore, higher values represent higher probabilities of losing, or higher risk 
acceptance. The descriptive statistics for Risk Acceptance are as follows: N= 593, M= 43, s.d.= 




Table 3.2 Binary Logit Regression of Electoral Factors for  
  Democratic Win 1970-2010 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
VARIABLES         B        Z 
__________________________________________________________ 
      ______                      ______ 
Prior Democrat Presidential Vote  0.1157  32.33*** 
Prior District Vote    0.0528  22.89*** 
Democrat Incumbent    2.7612  21.05*** 
Democrat Open Seat     2.0627  14.02*** 
Expenditures                3.34e-07    6.67*** 
Primary Vote Percent     0.0045    2.61** 
Southern Democrat    4.0156  11.29*** 
Northeast    -0.5822             -2.58*** 
West     -0.4664             -2.07*   
Midwest    -0.7582             -3.39*** 
South     -0.4103             -1.83 
Year 1966    -2.1273           -12.30*** 
Year 1968    -2.2551           -16.96*** 
Year 1970    -0.7927             -4.89*** 
Year 1974     2.9601  14.73*** 
Year 1976     3.3838  17.15***  
Year 1978     1.6314               8.87***  
Year 1986     2.4177   12.95***  
Year 1988     2.3752   12.75*** 
Year 1990     1.8958   10.41*** 
Year 1996     1.5425     9.27***  
Year 1998     0.4705               2.72*** 
Year 2000     0.1626               0.94 
Year 2006     1.0348               6.08*** 
Year 2008     1.4273               8.38*** 
Constant               -13.0518            -32.35*** 
 
Chi2       5503.88*** 
Pseudo R2      0.4665 
N       9,623 
PRE       0=93%, 1=67% 
_____________________________________________________________ 








Table 3.3 Summary Statistics of Risk Acceptance 
__________________________________________________  
 
    N 
 
Democrats   354 
Republicans   239 
Different Legislators  277 
States    45 
Female Observations  90 
Racial Minorities  63 
___________________________________________________ 
 
Validity and reliability are of utmost concern in any proxy measure. The first step in 
assessing these traits in the measure I propose is to test Risk Acceptance against the well-
established and accepted Rohde (1979) binary measure of risk acceptance. I test the independence 
of the two variables by recoding Risk Acceptance into a binary measure where 1 are legislators 
who fall above the mean (43) and 0 otherwise. The Chi-Square Test of Independence between Risk 
Acceptance and the Rohde measure is 92.28 (p< .05). That number indicates that the variables are 
related, or not independent of each other. I measure the strength of the relationship with the Yule’s 
Q test. The Yule’s Q of -0.72 is at the high end of moderate, almost strong relationship. I also 
include a Two-Sample T-Test between Risk Acceptance and the Rohde measure. The results 
indicate there is a statistically significant difference between the mean risk acceptance score for 
those Rohde codes as risk accepting and those who are not risk accepting (t= -13.62, p<.0000). In 
other words, the Rohde risk accepting (individuals scored a 1) have a statistically significantly 
higher mean Risk Acceptance score (67.3) than those who are not risk accepting (31.29). See the 






Figure 3.1 Kernel Density Plot Between Binary Risk Acceptance and Rohde Measure of Risk 
 
Returning to the full scale, Risk Acceptance moderately correlates with Rohde’s risk 
acceptance measure at .47, is statistically significant (p<.001), and in the expected direction.10 This 
indicates that risk-accepting legislators are more likely to run against an incumbent or for a seat 
that has been held by a member of the opposite party for at least two election cycles with 57% or 
more of the vote. These tests indicate strong evidence that Risk Acceptance and the Rohde measure 
are highly correlated and dependent upon one another. Therefore, we can conclude Risk 
Acceptance meets a high level of validity and reliability with the Rohde measure.  
To further test the validity and reliability, I include several additional analyses to test the 
effect of Risk Acceptance with various known factors in the literature. First, a Risk Acceptance 
                                                          
10 While a .47 correlation is considered moderately correlated, a high correlation between the two 







0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Low Risk                                                                                   High Risk
Binary Risk Acceptance Rohde Measure
45 
 
mean of 43 indicates that legislators are slightly biased towards lower levels of risk acceptance.11 
This is important given that most individuals are not risk accepting (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
A second test correlates Risk Acceptance with legislator ideology, party, and demographics. 
Scholars find that liberals, Democrats, females, people with lower education levels, and 
Caucasians identify as risk accepting (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2010). I use Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997) DW Nominate scores for legislator ideology. The structural correlates for risk acceptance 
are in Table 3.3. Legislators with a conservative ideology are less accepting of risk (p< .001) and 
Democrats are more accepting (p< .001). The correlates also indicate that Risk Acceptance has a 
stronger correlation than the Rohde measure of risk.  
A final test examines the legislators who are considered to have the highest and lowest 
levels of risk acceptance. With a score of 99.88, Christopher P. "Chris" Carney from 
Pennsylvania’s 10th congressional district is considered the most risk-accepting Democrat. When 
Carney initially entered the race in 2006, he was considered an extreme underdog given that 
Republicans had controlled the seat continuously since 1961. Scandals by the Republican 
incumbent would eventually make the race a tossup. The least risk-accepting Democrat is Jose’ 
Serrano in New York’s 16th congressional district. He took over the densely populated majority 
Hispanic district in 1990 with 92% of the vote in what is considered one of the safest congressional 
seats in the country. The most risk-accepting Republican is Robert Aderholt, who ran in Alabama’s 
4th congressional district during the 1996 elections. Democrats had held the seat since 1967, and 
the highly competitive race garnered direct support from then-Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich. The least risk-accepting Republican is Bill Cassidy from Louisiana’s 6th congressional 
district, who beat incumbent Democratic Congressman Don Cazayoux. Republicans had safely 
                                                          
11 58% of the observations are at or below the mean 
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held the seat for over 40 years until Cazayoux served a one-year term following a special-election 
victory. Republicans have held the seat since.  
 
Table 3.4 Structural Correlates of Risk Acceptance 
__________________________________________________  
                    Risk               Rohde 
                        Acceptance       Measure   
 
Conservative Ideology   -0.45***    -0.13**   
Democrat     0.54***     0.21*** 
Female    -0.06     -0.06   
Caucasian     0.19***     0.11**  
Higher Education    -0.06      0.01 
 
Rohde Measure    0.47***   ---------- 
____________________________________________________________________ 











CHAPTER 4. RISK ACCEPTANCE AND VOTER PARTICIPATION IN 
COMPULSORY VOTING COUNTRIES 
 
 
 Over the next two chapters I consider how risk acceptance influences the decision to 
participate in politics. I build on the work of Kam (2012), who finds that risk acceptance increases 
the likelihood of protesting but has no effect on voting. I further this line of inquiry in two ways. 
In the following chapter I consider the potential differences of protesting behavior between the 
risk accepting in democratic and non-democratic countries. In the present chapter I consider the 
potential differences of voting behavior between the risk accepting in voluntary and compulsory 
voting countries. I expect that risk acceptance will increase protesting but decrease voting 
participation.  
 
An Introduction to Risk and Compulsory Voting 
Scholars spend considerable resources to better understand why citizens vote. This is 
unsurprising given that voting is arguably the foundation for successful representation in 
democratic societies. When voter turnout is high elected officials have better communication with 
constituents (Mansbridge, 1994), democracies perform better (Powell, 1980), individuals have 
more political equality (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993), and citizens report higher levels of 
democratic satisfaction (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais & Gélineau, 2007). Yet, some individuals 
still abstain from the voting process. A well-established premise in the literature is that voting is a 
function of education (Leighley & Verdlitz, 1999), age (Sanchez, 2006), partisanship (Lien, 1994), 
race (Ghitza & Gelman, 2013; Leighley & Verdlitz, 1999; Lien, 1994), and institutions 
(Panagopoulos, 2008; Powell, 1980; Singh 2011). One of the leading explanations is that 
individuals will vote when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs (Downs, 1957). 
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The purpose of the present chapter is to test whether a psychological predisposition to risk 
acceptance influences voting behavior, and whether it can be detected amid other factors citizens 
consider when deciding to vote. To understand risk acceptance in the decision-making process 
empirically, scholars need to consider citizens’ acceptance of risk. Risk acceptance is the extent to 
which individuals are willing to challenge the status quo and how comfortable they are with 
uncertainty (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Kam, 2012; Levy, 2003). The risk accepting make 
systematically different decisions than the low risk accepting. The risk accepting are generally 
comfortable with uncertainty, more likely to challenge the status quo, and willing to accept 
potential losses (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Kam, 2012; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kam & Simas, 2012). 
Until recently, political scholars neglected how individuals’ acceptance of risk may 
influence political participation. Kam (2012) finds risk-accepting citizens are more likely to attend 
political meetings, rallies, and sign petitions because they find participation exciting and novel. 
However, she finds little evidence that risk acceptance influences voting behavior because voting 
is the fulfillment of one’s civic duty rather than an exciting and novel activity (Kam, 2012). 
Although the act of voting may not be exciting and novel, there are instances where abstaining 
might be.  
I distinguish this chapter from previous work by considering the sanctions and uncertainty 
of abstaining in compulsory voting systems compared to voluntary countries. By sanctions I mean 
when the government pursues some form of retribution for not voting. The sanctions can be social, 
such as disenfranchisement or losing access to public goods, or economic, such as fines. By 
uncertainty I mean the lack of knowledge that voters have about the sanctions. Compulsory voting 
laws are in place to compel citizens to vote (Massicottee, Blais, & Yoshinaka, 2004). Regardless 
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of the specific legislation, countries with obligatory voting policies share the same goal: to 
safeguard their political infrastructure from anemic participation rates (Blais, 2000), and previous 
research has borne out this premise (Franklin, 2001; Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1997; Panagopoulos, 
2008; Powell. 1980; Singh, 2011). Simply put, when voting is compulsory, turnout increases 
(Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). Indeed, the presence of substantial fines for abstaining makes 
it “paradoxical not to vote” (Singh, 2011, p. 96). However, some citizens in countries where voting 
is compulsory are still willing to abstain from elections, even when faced with strong sanctions.  
I consider the possibility that full turnout remains elusive in compulsory voting countries 
because risk-accepting individuals are undeterred by the sanctions that these countries impose for 
abstaining. Compulsory sanctions may not be enough to elicit voters to the ballot box because the 
risk accepting are willing to accept uncertainty and challenge the status quo. I use the World Values 
Survey (WVS) from 2006 to 2008 to test the theoretical framework. I find evidence that although 
compulsory voting increases voter turnout in the aggregate, the effects are much weaker for risk-
accepting individuals. The findings indicate the risk accepting are less likely to vote in compulsory 
systems compared to other members of society.  
A common foundation of compulsory voting theories is that it stimulates higher turnout 
(Fornos, Power, & Garand, 2004; Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). If, however, the risk 
accepting are less likely to vote then full participation will remain elusive. Countries with high 
risk-accepting populations should expect their compulsory sanctions to be less effective than 
countries with low risk-accepting populations.  
Although compulsory voting does increase voter turnout in the aggregate, it is modestly 
ineffective in increasing voter turnout for all segments of the population equally. Countries that 
implement compulsory voting should consider their risk-accepting populations when deciding 
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which financial and social sanctions governments impose for abstaining. Finally, if the risk 
accepting are less likely to vote then governments may enjoy even greater incumbent advantages 
(Kam & Simas, 2010) in compulsory systems.  
 
 
Participation in Voluntary and Compulsory Systems 
The likelihood that a single vote will influence the outcome of an election is an established 
paradox in the literature. It is unsurprising then that large segments of the population vote because 
it is the fulfillment of civic duty (Downs, 1957). Vote overreporting studies argue that individuals 
will claim to vote at rates higher than authenticated because of social desirability effects, or the 
desire to conform to societal norms (Karp & Brockington, 2005; Silver, Anderson, & Abramson, 
1986). In other words, voting is the status quo in democratic systems and individuals who do not 
vote are in the minority. Countries vary in their level of voter turnout, and compulsory systems 
may experience higher turnout than voluntary systems, but most citizens vote in most democratic 
countries.12  
Risk acceptance is motivated by uncertainty, excitement, and novelty and “such 
motivations are not well tied to the act of voting” because voting is “most characterized as 
fulfillment of civic duty” (Kam, 2012, p.829). There is, however, an important systematic 
difference between voter incentives in democratic countries with compulsory voting and those that 
                                                          
12 See the World Values Survey for a breakdown of self-reported voting rates by country (2005-
2006): Argentina 77.3%, Australia 94%, Brazil 87.6%, Bulgaria 62.3%, Canada 72.9%, Chile 
72.7%, Taiwan 71.9%, Cyprus 84.2%, Finland 76.1%, France 74.4%, Germany 77.4%, Italy 
83.9%, Japan 74.5%, South Korea 74.8%, Mexico 64.2%, Netherlands 74%, Norway 83%, 
Poland 66.6%, Sweden 85.8%, Switzerland 66.2%, Turkey 75.2%, United Kingdom 68.1%, 
United States 71.3%.  
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are voluntary. Although compulsory and voluntary systems both provide voters with a fulfillment 
of civic duty, only compulsory systems punish nonvoters. Abstainers in compulsory systems may 
face sanctions that nonvoters in voluntary systems do not have to worry about. Abstaining in a 
voluntary system may lead to a lack of psychological benefits such as fulfilling one’s civic duty, 
but abstaining in some compulsory systems may lead to a lack of psychological benefits and an 
increase in material costs such as fines. Voters do not face penalties for abstaining when voting is 
voluntary. Whereas in voluntary systems it is fulfillment of civic duty that causes one to vote, the 
sanctions in compulsory systems, at least in part, are the causal mechanisms for higher turnout.  
 
Compulsory Voting 
The consensus among scholars is that compulsory voting increases turnout. Compulsory 
voting systems punish abstainers in many forms. Economic sanctions include fines in Switzerland, 
Austria, Cyprus, Argentina, and Peru, and failure to pay the fines can result in prison sentences. 
Social sanctions include disenfranchisement in Belgium and Singapore, a loss of public services 
and goods in Peru, losing access to banks in Bolivia, and difficulty finding daycare in Italy and 
Mexico (IDEA 2001). Compulsory voting rates are higher than voluntary voting rates because 
citizens do not want to lose resources, be it social, economic, or otherwise, and these compulsory 
voting laws are highly effective in compelling citizens to vote (Fornos, Power, & Garand, 2004; 
Franklin, 2001; Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1997; Massicottee, Blais, & Yoshinaka, 2004; 
Panagopoulos, 2008; Powell, 1980; Singh, 2011). The costlier abstention becomes, the less likely 
individuals will abstain from the voting process (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). However, it 
is not enough for governments to only sanction nonvoters, they must also enforce the sanctions.  
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The lack of enforcement is the leading explanation among institutionalist scholars to 
explain why individuals still abstain in compulsory systems.  Institutionalists argue that individuals 
will continue to abstain when governments do not adequately enforce compulsory voting sanctions 
(Fornos, Power, & Garand, 2004; Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011), because without 
enforcement the sanction has no substantive influence on abstainers. The sanction is compulsory 
in name alone. Without enforcement individuals can stay home on Election Day without fearing a 
response from the government (Singh, 2011). While institutionalists find strong evidence for this 
claim, individuals continue to abstain when the sanctions are enforced. This leads one to conclude 
that either the sanctions are not tough enough to illicit full participation or segments of the 
population are motivated by factors other than punishment. Although the fines for abstaining are 
relatively minor in most countries, economic scholars show that small financial losses motivate 
individuals to change their behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This explains why twenty-
dollar fines have increased voting rates by as much as 10 percentage points (Panagopoulos, 2008). 
Simply put, people hate to lose stuff. It does not, however, explain why individuals continue to 
abstain. How might risk acceptance influence the decision to vote in compulsory systems?  
 
 
Risk Acceptance in Compulsory Systems 
Previous scholars find that voting is not a motivating factor for the risk accepting because 
voting is the fulfillment of civic duty, and civic duty does not provide participants with excitement 
or novelty (Kam, 2012). Although this may be the case in voluntary systems, in compulsory 
systems the risk accepting may still face a sanction for abstaining. Even though the risk accepting 
may not be motivated by civic duty, they may be motivated by potential sanctions. The 
fundamental difference between voluntary and compulsory systems is the enforcement of 
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sanctions. Individuals vote in voluntary systems to fulfill their civic duty (Downs, 1957; Kam, 
2012). Individuals vote in compulsory systems to avoid sanctions (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 
2011).  
If voting is the status quo in democratic countries, and the risk accepting are generally 
comfortable with uncertainty and more likely to challenge the status quo (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; 
Kam, 2012; Levy, 2003), then conforming to societal norms (i.e. fulfilling one’s civic duty) may 
be less likely for the risk accepting. Likewise, while in the aggregate compulsory voting laws 
increase voter turnout, individuals willing to challenge the status quo of avoiding sanctions for 
abstaining may be less likely to vote. If you are a risk taker, you may be willing to violate the 
compulsory voting requirement. I expect risk-accepting individuals will be more likely to accept 
the consequences of abstaining in compulsory systems, even when severe sanctions like 
imprisonment are possible, because they are comfortable with the uncertainty of potentially 
incurring voting sanctions and are more likely to challenge the status quo of fulfilling one’s civic 
duty. This leads to the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 4.1: There is a negative relationship 
between risk acceptance and turnout in compulsory voting countries.  
 
 
Data and Method of Analysis 
 To conduct the following analyses, I first need a survey data set with a diversity of countries 
to estimate the joint effects of risk acceptance and compulsory voting on voter turnout, but I also 
need a measure of risk acceptance which few surveys provide. I test the hypothesis guiding this 
chapter using data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS has a large sample size (N= 
61,615) collected between 2005 and 2008 and includes data from 42 countries representing a 
variety of political systems (presidential systems= 19; parliamentary systems= 23), geographic 
54 
 
regions, and a measure of risk acceptance. The WVS includes similar countries to those 
Panagopoulos (2008) examines which facilitates testing of the current hypothesis. The WVS has 
more recent years available, for instance through 2014, but those years either did not include 
questions on whether one voted, risk acceptance, or both and are excluded from the present 
analysis.13  
Another data limitation is using self-reported voting measures. Self-reported voting 
measures are susceptible to overreporting errors that are common in large surveys. Although this 
is a concern, scholars have demonstrated that overreporting is commonly due to social desirability 
biases in surveys at the U.S. (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012; Silver, Anderson, & Abramson, 1986) 
and international level (Karp & Brockington, 2005). Although overreporting should not invalidate 
the current findings, it is possible that risk-accepting individuals could be more (less) likely to 
overreport voting even if he or she did not.  Although the World Values Survey does have 
limitations, to my knowledge the WVS provides the best opportunity to test the theoretical 
framework. The main dependent variable is Turnout which is a dichotomous variable that 
measures whether an individual voted, coded 1 if respondent reported voting and 0 otherwise. 
Because Turnout is a dichotomous dependent variable I use a binary logistic regression. 
 
Risk Acceptance Variable 
 I model risk acceptance after several scholars who use comparable questions from the WVS 
and other large surveys (Berinsky & Lewis, 2007; Freese, 2004; Hoyle et al., 2002; Kam, 2012; 
                                                          
13 For example, the years 1990 and 1995 ask similar questions about risk, but they are limited 
only to “One should be cautious about making major changes in life” and “You will never 
achieve much unless you act boldly.” The WVS also asks the question in Wave 6 from 2010 to 




Miller, 2000; Morgenstern & Zechmeister, 2001). Risk is measured using a 6-point scale from one 
question in the WVS that ranges from 1-6, where 1 is low risk acceptance and 6 is high risk 
acceptance.14 The question asks respondents whether “Adventure and taking risks are important to 
this person; to have an exciting life.” 15 Although I only include one measure of risk acceptance in 
the model, Maestas and Pollock (2010) demonstrate that single-item measures of risk are valid and 
reliable.16 This question is also similar to questions used by Kam (2012).17 For a more detailed list 
of variable coding please see Chapter 3 and Table A4.1 in the Appendix.  
 
Country-Level Variables 
 To code compulsory voting laws I follow Singh (2011) and Panagopoulos’s (2008) coding 
from the IDEA for the following variables: Compulsory, Sanctions, Enforcement, and Severity.18 
I include several theoretically important control variables from the WVS, Polity IV, and Freedom 
House Index. The model includes country- and individual-level variables from the literature that 
influence voting such as age, employment, education, and political interest among others (Blais, 
                                                          
14 Scholars have coded risk in various ways in the political science literature. For example, 
Rohde (1979) and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) code risk acceptance of legislators as a 
binary variable of whether they ran for higher office against an incumbent or in an open seat. 
Additionally, Maestas et al. (2006) code risk using survey questions about financial security and 
career options. 
15 Older individuals (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) and women (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) 
are less risk accepting but higher educated individuals are more likely to take risks (Cagney et 
al., 2002).  
16 See: Maestas, Cherie D and Pollock, William M., Measuring Generalized Risk Orientation 
with a Single Survey Item (May 3, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599867 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1599867. 
17 For example, she uses the following questions in her risk scale “I like new and exciting 
experiences, even if I have to break the rules”, “I prefer friends who are exciting and 
unpredictable”, and “In general, how easy or difficult is it for you to accept taking risks?” 
18 Data about compulsory voting enforcement and sanctions are available from the International 




2006; Kam, 2012; Lijphart, 2012; Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). Compulsory is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country has compulsory voting and 0 otherwise. Sanctions is 
a four-point scale where 0 indicates the absence of sanctions, 1 minimal sanctions, 2 moderate 
sanctions, and 3 high sanctions. This variable measures the strength of compulsory sanctions. 
Enforcement is a four-point scale coded 0 for countries without enforcement laws, 1 low 
enforcement, 2 weak enforcement or 3 strict enforcement. This variable measures the strength of 
compulsory enforcement. Severity is a four-point scale coded 0 for countries without compulsory 
laws (i.e. United States), 1 if sanctions and enforcement are both low (i.e. Italy), 2 if sanctions and 
enforcement are weak (i.e. Brazil), and 3 if a country has high sanctions or strict enforcement (i.e. 




 I first consider the role of compulsory voting on voter turnout in Table 4.1 without any risk 
acceptance interaction terms to test the validity and reliability of the compulsory voting measures 
used by previous scholars. I find that Severity (b=0.283, p<.01) is positively correlated to voter 
turnout consistent with Singh’s (2011) findings. The only substantive difference between the 
current study and the work of previous scholars is that I find a statistically insignificant 
                                                          
19 Unfortunately, data limitations from the WVS do not provide countries with both high 
sanctions and high enforcement (i.e. Belgium). The Severity variable does still allow for testing 
countries with sanctions and enforcement but both mechanisms are weak or low. The presence of 
countries with high enforcement and high sanctions should only strengthen the theoretical 
framework given the findings below.  
20 There are other combinations of severity than what are measured in the present dissertation. 
For example, a country could have low sanctions but high enforcement or high sanctions but 
weak enforcement. However, data limitations do not allow for testing all possible combinations. 
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independent effect of compulsory voting on voter turnout when using clustered standard errors.21 
Moving from the lowest level to the highest level of severity, the probability of voting increases 
from 79 to 89 percent (p<.05). A 10-percentage point increase in the probability of voting 
associated with a shift toward stringent compulsory voting laws is consistent with previous 
literature (Franklin, 2001; Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1997; Powell, 1980). 
 
    
  
                                                          
21 When I use robust standard errors I find similar results to Singh (2011).  
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     Table 4.1 Binary Logit Estimates for Voting Sanctions and Voter Turnout 
     




     








 Severity --------- ---------  0.2830*** 
    (0.0827) 
 Sanctions ---------  0.00781 --------- 
   (0.2330)  
 Enforcement --------  0.3320 --------- 
   (0.2670)  
 Freedom  0.0990  0.0236  0.0208 
  (0.0636) (0.0493) (0.0486) 
 Parliament  0.233  0.0826  0.0959 
  (0.206) (0.1890) (0.1880) 
 Bicameral -0.393 -0.3040 -0.2930 
  (0.257) (0.2140) (0.2140) 
 President Election  0.401 -0.4070 -0.3710 
  (0.483) (0.3450) (0.3930) 
 GDP -1.79e-05 -2.03e-05** -1.93e-05** 
  (1.13e-05) (9.14e-06) (8.84e-06) 
 Population 
Density 
-0.0003  0.00057  0.0005 
  (0.0006) (0.00045) (0.0004) 
 Political Interest  0.452***  0.4900***  0.4900*** 
  (0.0407) (0.0329) (0.0328) 
 Employed  0.391***  0.3350***  0.3320*** 
  (0.0649) (0.0528) (0.0529) 
 Education  0.0703***  0.0520**  0.0538** 
  (0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0232) 
 Age  0.133***  0.1470***  0.1480*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0158) (0.0159) 
 Age2 -0.00107*** -0.00119*** -0.0012*** 
  (0.00017) (0.00015) (0.0001) 
 Sex  0.0204  0.1070***  0.1070*** 
  (0.0725) (0.0356) (0.0353) 
 Constant -4.485*** -2.276*** -3.037*** 
  (0.643) (0.608) (0.531) 
 N 56,654 53,619 53,619 
   Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008. Notes: Clustered Standard Errors included by country. Year dummy  
variables excluded for brevity, excluded year is 2008. #p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001, two-tailed. 
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Risk Acceptance and Voting 
I use the same multivariate model in Table 4.2 as in Table 4.1, but in Table 4.2 I include a 
series of interaction variables to capture the effects of risk on the relationship between compulsory 
voting (and its variants) and turnout; moreover, I exclude the control variables from the table for 
the sake of brevity. Model 1 in Table 4.2 shows the base equation without interaction terms for 
Risk (b= -0.0195, p= 0.242), and Model 2 includes the interaction between Risk and Compulsory 
Voting (b= 0.0735, p= 0.127). In both models risk acceptance has no effect on voting. Model 3 
shows Risk (b= -0.0311, p< .05) has a negative and significant effect on voter turnout when 
controlling for Sanctions and Enforcement. Once again, neither the coefficients for Sanctions (b= 
-0.0282, p= 0.905) nor the coefficients for Enforcement (b= 0.338, p=.194) are statistically 
significant predictors of voting. Model 4 includes the interaction Risk x Sanctions (b= -.0011, p= 
0.956) and Risk x Enforcement (b= -.0279, p= 0.134). Neither of the interaction terms reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance. However, Risk (b= -.0766, p< .001) is statistically 
significant independent of the sanction and enforcement interaction terms when the coefficients 
for Sanctions and Enforcement both equal 0. Model 5 shows Risk (b= -0.0307, p< .05) and Severity 
(b= 0.264, p< .01) have a positive and statistically significant independent effect on the probability 
of voting. The final column, Model 6, depicts a different story. The interaction term Risk x Severity 
is statically significant and indicates a negative directional effect suggesting that as the level of 
risk and severity increases the probability of voting decreases (b= -.0241, p< .05). Because the 
coefficients of interaction terms in nonlinear models are not directly interpretable I discuss the 
substantive results of Model 6 below with predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals 





Table 4.2 Binary Logit Estimates for Voting Sanctions on Risk Acceptance and Voter Turnout 
 
        
 VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3  Model-4 Model-5 Model-6 
 
        
 Risk -0.0195 -0.042 -0.0311** -0.0766*** -0.0307** -0.0184 
  (0.0167) (0.0240) (0.0148) (0.0174) (0.0149) (0.0180) 
 Compulsory  0.1170 -0.0335  --------  --------  --------  -------- 
  (0.262) (0.312)     





 0.0735  --------  --------  --------  -------- 
   (0.0480)     
 Sanction  ---------  -------- -0.0282 -0.0319  --------  -------- 
    (0.2360) (0.2500)   
 Enforcement  ---------  --------  0.3380  0.4070  --------  -------- 
    (0.260) (0.2630)   
 Risk x Sanction  ---------  --------  -------- -0.0011  --------  -------- 
     (0.0210)   
 Risk x Enforce  ---------  --------  -------- -0.0279  --------  -------- 
     (0.0186)   




























      (0.0830) (0.0858) 
 Risk x Severity  --------  --------  --------  --------  -------- -0.0242** 
       (0.00966) 
 Constant -5.087*** -5.011*** -2.915*** -2.810*** -3.635*** -3.665*** 
  (0.533) (0.526) (0.514) (0.515) (0.425) (0.425) 
        
 Observations 49,643 49,643 46,632 46,632 46,632 46,632 
    Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008 
    Notes: Clustered Standard Errors included at country level of analysis. Table includes all control variables from Table 4.1.  
   #p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001, two-tailed. 
 
In Figure 4.1 I graph the probability of voting as a function of compulsory voting severity 
conditioned by risk acceptance.  Moving from the lowest level of risk acceptance (1) to the highest 
level of risk acceptance (6) decreases the probability of voting by 1.5 percentage points in countries 
without compulsory voting, 3 percentage points in countries with low severity, 3.9 percentage 
points in countries with medium severity, and 4.4 percentage points in countries with high severity. 
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Higher levels of compulsory voting severity still increase voter turnout consistent with previous 
findings in the literature. However, the slope of the line decreases in magnitude as the level of risk 
acceptance increases. For example, individuals with the lowest level of risk acceptance (1) have a 
91.1% probability of voting in countries with high severity but individuals with the highest level 
of risk acceptance (6) only have an 86.7% probability of voting in countries with high severity 
(p<.05). To put this in perspective, the results indicate that highly risk-accepting individuals with 
a score of 6 who live in countries with high severity sanctions have the same probability of voting 
as low risk-accepting individuals living in countries with low severity sanctions and enforcement.  
To test the institutional differences between countries I classified countries as old or new 
democracies consistent with the work of Pippa Norris. One advantage of classifying democracies 
as old or new allows us to further isolate institutional differences that may be driving the results 
above. However, this drops the number of country observations from 42 to 28 because only 
democratic countries are included in the model. It is important to note that the theoretical 
framework is not limited to only democratic countries. In Table 4.3 Risk Acceptance is statistically 
significant in new democracies (p< .05, one-tailed; p=.097, two-tailed) but has no statistically 
significant effect on old democracies (p= .200, two-tailed). While these results weaken the strength 
of risk acceptance on compulsory voting, the results provide more evidence that the results are a 
function of personality, albeit only in newer democracies. 
The reduction in the probability of voting by ~4.5 percentage points for risk-accepting 
individuals lowers the effectiveness of compulsory voting by almost one-half of the 10-percentage 
point gain from implementing compulsory voting (Franklin, 2001; Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1997; 
Powell, 1980). These results suggest that the effectiveness of compulsory voting as a universally 
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applicable mobilization tool is debatable and may not be as robust as initially thought once we 
consider individual acceptance of risk.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Binary Logit Estimates for Voting Severity on Risk Acceptance and Voter  
      Turnout by New and Old Democracies 
 
VARIABLES         New Democracy         Old Democracy 
 
Risk Acceptance   -0.0518#   -0.0183     
(0.0312)        (0.0142) 
Severity       -0.1605#       0.4049*** 
(0.0870)   (0.0529)  
Risk x Severity        0.0046      -0.0157 
(0.0179)   (0.0133) 
Freedom         0.3396***       0.9220*** 
(0.1067)       (0.2756) 
Parliament     -0.7441**      -0.1335 
(0.2607)   (0.1790) 
Bicameral       -0.0673      -0.1633 
(0.1774)     (0.2222)  
Presidential Election       0.3566**      ---------- 
(0.1271)   ---------- 
GDP        -0.0001***      7.46e-06 
(0.0000)        (0.00002) 
Population Density       0.0025***       0.0007** 
(0.0006)   (0.0003) 
Political Interest       0.3279***      0.6611*** 
(0.0495)   (0.0556)  
Employment       0.3044***     0.3820*** 
(0.0736)     (0.0731) 
Education         0.0353       0.1462***  
(0.0246)      (0.0201)   
Age          0.1871***       0.0986***  
(0.0231)       (0.0137) 
Age2        -0.0017***       -0.0006*** 










VARIABLES         New Democracy         Old Democracy 
 
Sex          0.0276       0.1940* 
(0.0541)     (0.0782) 
Year05      -1.6104***       0.3801# 
(0.2630)     (0.2008) 
Year06     -1.2662***     ----------  
(0.2151)     ----------  
Year07      -3.2298***     ----------  
(0.4314)     ---------- 
Constant      -3.8000***      -14.9432*** 
(0.9322)   (2.8587) 
 
Observations     18,617    13,412 
    Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008 






Figure 4.1 Predicted Probability of Voting For                            Figure 4.2 Predicted Probability of Voting For                Figure 4.3 Predicted Probability of Voting For 




Figure 4.4 Predicted Probability of Voting For                        Figure 4.5 Predicted Probability of Voting For                Figure 4.6 Predicted Probability of Voting For 














































































Why are some individuals more likely to vote than others? Previous studies argue that voter 
participation is correlated with race, income, education, ideology, and political interest among 
many other factors (Ghitza & Gelman, 2013; Leighley & Verdlitz, 1999; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 
1978). Perhaps the most common explanation why people vote is attributed to the costs and 
benefits of voting (Downs, 1957). This chapter argues that risk acceptance can also help scholars 
better understand why individuals vote. Scholars use risk acceptance to predict many individual 
behaviors. For example, risk acceptance influences which candidate voters prefer (Kam & Simas, 
2012; Tomz & van Houweling, 2009), attitudes toward foreign policy (Eckles & Schaffner, 2011) 
and free trade (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010), and political policies with uncertain outcomes (Kam & 
Simas, 2010). Previous studies have even considered how risk acceptance influences voting (Kam, 
2012), but the findings were not statistically significant.  
The voting literature is important because higher voter turnout rates suggest a healthy 
democracy and enables citizens to signal preferences to political elites (Mansbridge, 1994; 
Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). The findings in the present chapter indicate compulsory voting laws 
decrease voter turnout for the risk accepting. Jackman (1987) claims “mandatory voting laws 
produce a disincentive to not vote” (p. 405). However, this chapter adds to the voting literature by 
providing evidence that compulsory voting laws can indeed incentivize individuals to abstain. 
Large segments of the Indonesian (40.2), Indian (44.7), and Ghana (51.8) populations have risk 
acceptance levels that are at least one standard deviation above the mean. Other countries, such as 
the Netherlands (64.0), Japan (64.4), and Egypt, (67.2) have populations whose risk acceptance 
levels are at least one standard deviation below the mean. If higher levels of risk acceptance lead 
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to lower levels of voter turnout, then it is reasonable to conclude that compulsory voting may be 
less effective in countries with large risk-accepting populations. 
This chapter highlights limitations to compulsory voting that have otherwise been 
unknown to scholars. A reduction of 4.5 percentage points for the risk-accepting population may 
lead to more low risk-accepting voters participating, which in turn may lead to fewer risk-accepting 
policies. Indeed, governments may be incentivized to implement compulsory voting laws to 
maintain their power, rather than to make voting more representative and democratic. This has real 
political and representational consequences. Consider that theoretically, the findings indicate 
incumbent governments could benefit from decreased voter turnout in compulsory voting systems.  
Kam and Simas (2010) find evidence that risk-accepting individuals are more likely to vote 
for the challenger rather than the incumbent. The evidence in this chapter indicates that compulsory 
voting leads to a decline in the probability of voting for risk-accepting individuals while those who 
are low risk accepting have a significantly higher probability of voting. This would indicate 
favorable biases for the incumbent government and the low risk-accepting voters. If compulsory 
voting leads to a decrease in votes for the risk accepting, then (1) risk-accepting individuals may 
be underrepresented by political elites and (2) governments with compulsory voting may receive 




CHAPTER 5. RISK ACCEPTANCE AND PROTEST PARTICIPATION 
 
I continue the investigation from Chapter 4 about how risk acceptance influences political 
participation in the present chapter by considering the influence of risk acceptance on protesting 
behavior in democratic and non-democratic countries. Although the theoretical argument in the 
present chapter is similar to the previous, the expected outcomes are different. I argued in the 
previous chapter that the risk accepting would be less likely to vote (i.e. participate in politics), 
because abstaining provided an opportunity for the risk accepting to challenge the status quo of 
voting social norms. In this chapter, however, we should expect the risk accepting to be more likely 
to participate in politics because protesting provides an opportunity to challenge the status quo of 
perceived political and social injustices. Likewise, protests are uncertain, costly, and may lead to 
physical or financial harm that may deter participation by less risk-accepting members of society 
but encourage participation by the most risk accepting. 
 
An Introduction to Risk and Protesting 
Why do some members of society participate in protests while others passively turn a blind 
eye? Theories of protesting behavior argue that individuals protest when other institutional 
mechanisms have failed or to right perceived political and social injustices. Seminal studies argue 
that protesting is a function of alienation from traditional representative channels (Gurr, 1970), a 
way to civically express oneself (Inglehart, 1977; 1997), and the context of the political 
environment. More recent work has considered psychological explanations of protesting behavior 
such as an individual’s acceptance of risk. Kam (2012) finds strong evidence that risk-accepting 
individuals in the United States are more likely to report a willingness to protest than the low risk 






In this chapter I build on Kam’s (2012) model of political participation as a function of risk 
acceptance and consider how protest behavior may vary in different political systems.  Does the 
willingness to participate in protests vary in democratic and non-democratic countries? To 
understand risk acceptance in the decision-making process to protest, scholars need to consider 
legislators’ acceptance of risk. Risk acceptance is the extent to which individuals seek out risky 
behaviors and uncertain outcomes (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  Risk-
accepting individuals are generally comfortable with uncertainty (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010; Levy, 
2003) and they are more likely to pursue exciting activities (Zuckerman, 1979; 2007). If the risk 
accepting are comfortable with uncertainty and more likely to pursue exciting activities, then they 
may be more likely to participate in protests compared to other members of society. 
Protests are uncertain because participants may be subject to bodily harm, citations, 
imprisonment, or death. Many of the recent protests in Baltimore in the United States and the Arab 
Spring ended with property damage and the loss of life. While these are extreme examples of 
protesting, they are oftentimes a likely outcome. There is also uncertainty as to whether the 
government will grant concessions to the demands of protestors. Although protestors are often 
successful in achieving their goals (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), 
there is no guarantee the government will concede. The lack of participation from the general 
public is unsurprising when one considers the potential for harm and the uncertainty of achieving 
the intended goals during a protest (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). Indeed, protest scholars 
argue that the preferred choice of the general public is to free ride (Chong, 1994).  
I examine the theoretical framework using World Values Survey data from 2006 to 2008. 
The findings indicate that risk acceptance is a robust predictor of protest activity in 





accepting counterparts to participate in protests in non-democratic countries. When citizens 
participate in politics they report. This has important political implications for non-democratic 
citizens given that protests often achieve their intended goals (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; 
Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008) and that protestors report higher democratic satisfaction (Anderson 
et al., 2005; Blais & Gélineau, 2007) and political equality (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). One 
implication is that countries with large risk-accepting populations are probably more likely to 
achieve concessions from their non-democratic government. Countries have large variations in 
risk-accepting populations around the world. Consider that large segments of the Indonesian 
(40.2), Indian (44.7), and Ghanaian (51.8) populations have risk acceptance levels that are at least 
one standard deviation below the mean. Other countries, such as the Netherlands (64.0), Japan 
(64.4), and Egypt, (67.2) have populations whose risk acceptance levels are at least one standard 
deviation above the mean. We should expect more protesting in the latter group than the former. 
Second, the hesitation to participate in protests by countries with low risk-accepting populations 
may provide non-democratic regimes with more political stability. Without internal pressure by 
the risk accepting, nondemocracies may continue to harbor undemocratic principles or, at a 
minimum, quell any such rebellion beforehand with impunity. 
 
Why do People Protest? 
Scholars spend considerable time to better understand why individuals participate in 
politics. Previous studies argue that participation is correlated with race, income, education, 
ideology, and political interest among many other factors (Ghitza & Gelman, 2013; Leighley & 
Verdlitz, 1999; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 1978). Perhaps the most common explanation why 





(Downs, 1957). However, the probability that an individual will bring about change to the political 
system is miniscule and an established paradox in the literature (Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957). 
This sentiment has led protest scholars to argue that participation is a factor of dissatisfaction or 
alienation with traditional representative channels such as voting or contacting political elites 
(Gurr, 1970), often because these individuals lack other resources to bring about political change 
(Tarrow, 1995).  
Political change can only occur when individuals are willing to participate in politics, and 
many often do so out of a sense of civic pride or duty (Downs, 1957). Likewise, recent literature 
suggests that protests are a function of civic expression, or simply another means to a political end 
(Inglehart, 1977; 1997), and scholars argue that individuals participate in protests to have their 
voices heard by the government (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). Protests create 
untraditional channels of communication with political elites that are often harder to ignore than 
more traditional forms of participation. For example, protests allow citizens to convey important 
policy preferences to Members of Parliament (Hooghe & Marien, 2014), protests increase 
legitimacy to political elites (Gilljam, Persson, & Karlsson, 2012), and protests communicate 
desires for social justice (Gillion, 2012). When individuals participate in these untraditional 
channels of communication they are often effective in bringing about policy and other systemic 
changes (Gamson, 1990; Rochon & Mazmamian, 1993; Schumaker, 1975). 
However, for citizens to have successful communication with political elites using protests, 
individuals must be willing to incur greater costs and accept greater levels of uncertainty than 
traditional methods of political participation.  Unlike other forms of political participation such as 
voting, protests are in public view rather than in the privacy of a voting booth, they allow 





or signing a petition alone, and they are untraditional forms of expression rather than ritualistic 
exercises performed every few years. The consequences of participating in protests are much 
greater than traditional methods of participation such as voting or contacting representatives. When 
individuals participate in protests they risk uncertain legal and financial sanctions for themselves 
and the surrounding community. The recent protests in Ferguson and Baltimore in the United 
States and the Arab Spring in the Middle East are examples of the negative consequences that can 
occur in extreme situations. Several of the recent global protests has ended with the loss of life. 
This is not to suggest that all protests are dangerous or uncertain. However, in many 
circumstances protests are not for the faint-of-heart. Protests can involve public displays of 
emotion that are oftentimes loud and motivated by anger and typically involve large groups of 
people. According to sociology scholars these groups are considered expressive crowds. An 
expressive crowd is when “the audience also wants to be a member of the crowd, and participate 
in crowd behavior-to scream, shout, cheer, clap, and stomp their feet” (Goode, 1992, p.23). This 
type of behavior is common at political rallies, street demonstrations, and public protests. Protests 
provide an exciting opportunity for individuals to express their emotions for a political cause and 
to do so as an assembly rather than as an individual. The audible and visual stimulation of protests 
creates an exciting environment that is unique compared to other forms of political participation. 
One eye-witness to the London anti-austerity protests reported saying that “It’s been quite exciting: 
if I was a bit younger and had a bit more inclination I would have joined in.”22  
The scholarly evidence also indicates that fewer individuals are likely to participate in 
protests compared to other forms of political participation. Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst (2005) 
find that only 39 percent of the population have participated in a demonstration, 32 percent have 
                                                          





boycotted, and 7 percent have joined a strike. These participation rates are quite low compared to 
individuals who have reported voting (97%) or signing a petition (76%). The large gap between 
voter turnout and protesting rates suggests that there are systematic differences between who 
engages in the former activity but not the latter. Individuals in the latter group are willing to accept 
greater potential negative consequences that stem from protesting.  
 
Risk Acceptance and Non-Democratic Countries 
Protestors achieve their goals by making threats against the government and disrupting the 
political environment to change the status quo (DeNardo, 1985; Piven & Cloward, 1977). 
Governments have four potential responses to protests. They can: (1) concede to the demands of 
challengers without repression, (2) repress the challengers without concessions, (3) tolerate the 
challenge without concession or repression, or (4) repress the challenges but grant concessions 
(Franklin, 2009). Protesters win concessions when governments concede to their demands and 
goals, while repressions are the negative consequences governments enact in response to protests. 
I focus on the theoretical implications of concessions and repressions on the decision to protest.  
Scholars find that higher levels of democracy lead to lower levels of political repression 
and higher levels of government concession (Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 1991). Conversely, 
non-democratic regimes are more likely to “subjugate citizens to prevent any kind of threat” 
(Regan & Henderson, 2002, p. 3). Democracies inherently respond to the wishes of its citizens, 
while non-democratic regimes provide fewer rights and are less beholden to institutional 
constraints (Davenport, 1999; Poe et al., 1999), which enables their leaders to repress impending 
threats. Despite potential consequences for engaging in protest activities, particularly in non-





Since risk-accepting individuals are generally comfortable with uncertainty (Ehrlich & 
Maestas, 2010; Levy, 2003), they may be more likely to challenge the status quo and accept losses 
that may arise from protesting in non-democracies (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In non-
democratic countries, the risk accepting (1) may overestimate the chance of protests achieving 
their goal and (2) have greater confidence that the government will not respond with negative 
consequences. Their higher willingness to challenge the status quo and accept losses, and their 
comfortability with uncertainty suggest the risk accepting may protest at higher rates than other 
members of society. This leads to the first hypothesis. Hypothesis 5.1: There is a positive 
relationship between risk acceptance and protest activity in non-democratic countries. 
Elected political elites are constrained by democratic principles that unelected leaders need 
not follow, so the consequences of protesting in non-democratic countries are more severe. Voters 
who are part of protest movements in democratic societies may punish elected leaders in future 
elections (Gartner & Regan, 1996). This suggests greater uncertainty when protesting in non-
democratic countries, as non-democratic leaders are less likely to grant concessions to their 
citizens and more likely to repress those who engage in protests (Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 
1991). Indeed, protests are far more likely to take place in democracies than authoritarian countries 
(Przeworski et al., 2000), in part because democracies “allow their citizens greater freedoms of 
expression” (Vanhuysse, 2006, p. 1).  
Democratic citizens possess numerous avenues to influence their government that non-
democratic citizens do not have, such as voting, petitioning, attending rallies and meetings, and 
writing letters. These measures minimize the use of violent methods by citizens against the 
government (Regan & Henderson, 2002). Therefore, we should expect a weaker relationship 





Hypothesis 5.2: Risk acceptance has a weaker positive relationship on protest activity in 
democratic countries.  
 
Data and Method of Analysis 
I test the hypotheses using 2006-2008 data from the World Values Survey (WVS), which 
has a large sample size (N= 70,500) over multiple years and includes a measure of risk acceptance. 
The WVS has data available through 2014, but those years either do not include questions about 
risk acceptance, protest behavior, or both. The WVS contains a variety of political systems, 
geographic regions, and control variables that scholars find influence protest behavior (Blais, 
2006; Kam, 2012; Lijphart, 2012; Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005).  
 The WVS asks respondents “Have you ever participated in a demonstration?” and “Have 
you ever participated in a boycott?”23 Although I make no hypotheses differentiating between 
boycotts and demonstrations, the literature indicates substantive differences between the two 
activities (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). We should expect individuals who report having 
boycotted do so at different rates than those who report having demonstrated, and the inclusion of 
Risk Acceptance may further exaggerate the differences. Demonstrate and Boycott are three-point 
scales coded 0 if respondents said they would “never do this,” 1 if they “might do this,” and 2 if 
they “have done this.” I analyze the dependent variables using multinomial logit with clustered 
standard errors set at the country-level of analysis. A hierarchical multinomial logit regression with 
fixed-effects is available in the Appendix (See: Table A5.9).  
                                                          
23 Respondents can choose from “I would never do this” (boycott= 61.35%, demonstrate= 
47.25%), “I might do this” (boycott= 28.74%, demonstrate= 34.39%), or “I have done this” 





I measure risk acceptance using a similar approach to that used previously by other scholars 
(Berinsky & Lewis, 2007; Freese, 2004; Hoyle et al., 2002; Kam, 2012; Miller, 2000). For 
example, Kam (2012) uses the following statements in her risk scale: “I like new and exciting 
experiences, even if I have to break the rules” and “In general, how easy or difficult is it for you 
to accept taking risks?” Similarly, the WVS asks respondents whether “Adventure and taking risks 
are important to this person; to have an exciting life.” Responses range from “very much like me” 
to “not at all like me.” I code Risk Acceptance as a 6-point index where 0 is “not at all like me” 
and 5 is “very much like me”24 and higher values represent a greater acceptance of risk. The WVS 
provides a 10-question index of risk attitudes and behavior, but for the sake of brevity and ease of 
interpretation, I include only the 6-point scale. Analyses with the 10-question index’s 45-point 
scale, which is correlated with the 6-point scale at .60, is available in Figure A5.1 in the appendix.25  
I correlate risk acceptance with Age (-.23, p< .001), Sex (-.13, p< .001), and Education (.07, 
p< .001) as an initial test of the validity and reliability of the current measure. The correlations are 
statistically significant and in the expected direction. The older and female populations are less 
likely to identify as risk accepting, while the higher educated are more likely (Weber, Blais, & 
Betz, 2002). To test the validity and reliability of Risk Acceptance further, I correlate risk 
acceptance on private and safer political activities such as voting and petitioning (See Table A5.2 
in the Appendix). The insignificant relationship between risk acceptance, voting, and petitioning 
in Table A5.2 is consistent with Kam’s (2012) expectation that the relationships between risk 
acceptance and voting will be statistically insignificant because “voting is most characterized as 
                                                          
24 Political scholars have coded risk in various ways in the literature. For example, Maestas et al. 
(2006) code risk using survey questions about financial security and career options.  
25 The results between Table 5.1 and Table A5.9 are similar. One major difference is the lack of 





fulfillment of duty, and given that duty least motivates risk seekers…the act of voting is the 
exception, not the rule” (pg. 829). Together these findings provide strong evidence that the current 
measure of risk acceptance meets the criteria of validity and reliability.  
I code Non-Democracy as a dichotomous variable where nondemocracies are coded as 1 
and 0 otherwise using the Freedom House Index. Democracies are countries with “a score of 7 or 
better in the Electoral Process subcategory and an overall political rights score of 20 or better” (p. 
3).26 Table A5.3 in the Appendix includes a detailed listing of each country used in the analysis by 
regime type. I also include an interaction term in Table A5.4 in the Appendix between Freedom 
House and Risk Acceptance, which includes more detailed measures of civil rights and liberties.27 
Risk-accepting individuals are far more likely to report a willingness to “might do” a protest and 
boycott. 
I also include theoretically important control variables in the models. These factors are 
social structures, motivational attitudes, government support, and political behaviors. The protest 
literature often finds that Education, Employment, Political Interest, Social Trust, Party Member, 
and Labor Member have a positive effect on protesting, and that Age, Sex, Religiosity, Ideology, 
and Government Confidence have a negative effect (Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). 




                                                          
26 A detailed breakdown of the scores are available here: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology_FIW_2015.pdf  
27 The Freedom House variable is coded 1 for countries with low liberties to 16 for countries with 






The effects of risk acceptance on demonstrating and boycotting without interaction terms 
are consistent with Kam’s findings (2012).28 In Table 5.1 I report the multinomial logit results of 
risk acceptance and non-democracy on protesting with “never do” as the baseline (comparison) 
group. The coefficient for Risk Acceptance is the effect of risk acceptance on the dependent 
variable for democracies (i.e., when Non-Democracy is equal to 0), while the interaction tells us 
the differences in the effects of risk acceptance for non-democratic and democratic countries. Risk 
Acceptance x Non-Democracy reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for 
individuals who “have done” (b= 0.2476, p<.01) and “might do” (b= 0.2895, p<.001) a 
demonstration compared to individuals who would never participate, controlling for all other 
factors in the model. Table 5.1 also shows Risk Acceptance x Non-Democracy reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance for individuals who “have done” (b= 0.1878, p<.01) 
and “might do” (b= 0.2778, p<.001) a boycott compared to individuals who would never 
participate. This shows strong initial evidence for the first hypothesis. The risk accepting are very 
likely to report having participated, or being willing to participate, in non-democratic protests.29  
I report the marginal probability of demonstrating by risk acceptance and system of 
government in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 with 95% confidence intervals and all other factors set to their 
mean. As individuals’ level of risk acceptance increases, the likelihood they will report a 
willingness to participate in a demonstration also increases while the likelihood of reporting a 
willingness to never participate decreases.  Moving from the lowest (0) to the highest level of risk 
acceptance (5), the probability of participation increases from 23.8% to 47.6% for individuals in 
                                                          
28 The risk accepting are much more likely to protest. For the sake of brevity this analysis is not 
included in the present chapter. Findings available in Table A5.6.   





nondemocracies who reported they might demonstrate (p< .05). This represents a two-fold increase 
in the likelihood of participating. There is, however, no statistically significant difference when 
moving from the lowest (0) to the highest level (5) of risk acceptance for individuals in 
democracies who report they might demonstrate (41.0% to 47.6%).  
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 paint a similar picture. Moving from the lowest (0) to the highest level 
of risk acceptance (5), the probability of participation increases from 4% to 9% for individuals in 
nondemocracies who reported they might boycott (p<.05). Individuals with the highest risk-
accepting score are more than twice as likely to report a willingness to boycott compared to those 
with the lowest score. Again, there is no statistically significant difference when moving from the 
lowest (0) to the highest level (5) of risk acceptance for individuals in democracies who report 







Table 5.1   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics by System of  
      Government 2006-2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                            Demonstrate             Boycott  
     Might Do  Have Done Might Do Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance x Non-Democracy  0.2895***  0.2476**  0.2778***  0.1878** 
     (0.0408) (0.0890) (0.0415) (0.0665) 
Non-Democracy   -1.0184  -0.9817  -0.9792# -1.0633 
     (0.7622) (0.9951) (0.6209) (0.7866) 
Risk Acceptance    -0.0087**   0.0163*   0.0207   0.0924** 
     (0.0031) (0.0071) (0.0141) (0.0337) 
Social Structure 
Age      -0.0161*** -0.0070*** -0.0078*  0.0035 
     (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0034) (0.0031) 
Sex     -0.0736  -0.0747  -0.1107*** -0.0914 
     (0.0750) (0.0920) (0.0228) (0.0756) 
Education     0.07850***  0.1914***  0.0907***  0.2251*** 
     (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0105) (0.0036) 
Employment      0.0066    0.0390   0.0960#  0.2866# 
     (0.0735) (0.0561) (0.0511) (0.1474) 
Religiosity    -0.0248  -0.0528  -0.0609*** -0.0725*** 
     (0.0182) (0.0414) (0.0046) (0.0218) 
Motivational Attitudes 
Ideology    -0.0861*** -0.2141*** -0.0886*** -0.1598*** 
     (0.0253) (0.0158) (0.0199) (0.0057) 
Political Interest    0.2717**  0.5386***  0.3153***  0.6019*** 
     (0.1059)  (0.1382) (0.0529) (0.0796) 
Systems Support 
Government Confidence  -0.0779  -0.2287# -0.1128  -0.2456# 
     (0.0807) (0.1445) (0.0839) (0.1476) 
Social Trust     0.0679   0.1163   0.3007#  0.4836** 
     (0.1226) (0.1085) (0.1645) (0.1737) 
Political Behavior 
Party Member     0.1882   0.5589***  0.1144   0.4857** 
     (0.1271) (0.1321) (0.1185) (0.1087) 
Labor Member     0.1370   0.7966***  0.2232*  0.8175*** 
     (0.1010) (0.0976) (0.0932) (0.0130) 
 
Constant       0.7813*** -0.1508  -0.4850#  -2.9924*** 
 
N       26,775   26,775   26,435    26,435 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Year variables are excluded for  
brevity, excluded year is 2008. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might Do); 2 (Have Done) with baseline category “Never Do.”  






Risk acceptance seems to have a much stronger effect on protest behavior in 
nondemocracies compared to democracies. The risk accepting in non-democratic countries report 
a higher likelihood of “might do” and a lower level of “never do” compared to the risk accepting 
in democracies. Although risk acceptance increases the likelihood of protesting in democracies, 
the effect is weaker than in non-democratic countries.  
To test the relationship further, I include an interaction between Risk Acceptance and 
Freedom in Table 5.2 with “never do” as the baseline (comparison) group. Although the 
substantive results are weaker than Table 5.1, there is still evidence to suggest that the level of 
political freedom influences the willingness to protest. Risk Acceptance x Freedom reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance for individuals who “might do” (b= 0.0218, p< .05) 
a demonstration compared to individuals who would never participate, controlling for all other 
factors in the model. Table 5.2 shows Risk Acceptance x Freedom almost reaches conventional 
levels of statistical significance for individuals who “might do” (b= 0.0229, p<.10) a boycott 
compared to individuals who would never participate. 
I report the marginal probability of demonstrating by risk acceptance and level of freedom 
in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 with 95% confidence intervals and all other factors set to their mean. There 
is a stark contrast between the willingness to demonstrate between low freedom and high freedom 
countries. In high freedom countries, the most risk accepting report a 72% likelihood of never 
demonstrating (see Figure 5.5). The most risk accepting in low freedom countries report only a 
25% likelihood of never demonstrating (see Figure 5.6). In other words, highly risk-accepting 
individuals in countries with high freedoms are three times more likely to report a willingness to 





The results are similar for boycotting. In high freedom countries, the most risk accepting 
report an 80% likelihood of never demonstrating (see Figure 5.7). The most risk accepting in low 





Table 5.2   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics by Freedom  
     House Scores 2006-2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                        Demonstrate             Boycott  
     Might Do      Have Done Might Do Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance x Freedom    0.0218*  0.0078   0.0229#  0.0148   
     (0.0131) (0.0104) (0.0157) (0.0095) 
Freedom     -0.2361*** -0.2378*** -0.2281*** -0.2974*** 
     (0.0387) (0.0229) (0.0329) (0.0605) 
Risk Acceptance   -0.0651   0.0093  -0.0388   0.0549 
     (0.0564) (0.0549) (0.0637) (0.0726) 
Social Structure 
Age      -0.0209*** -0.0123*** -0.0119*** -0.0019 
     (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
Sex     -0.0929* -0.0964# -0.1313*** -0.1194 
     (0.0470) (0.0582) (0.0351) (0.0888) 
Education     0.0639***  0.1703***  0.0730***  0.2061*** 
     (0.0181) (0.0279) (0.0215) (0.0290) 
Employment      0.0260    0.0551   0.1133#  0.3094*** 
     (0.0972) (0.1159) (0.0594) (0.0873) 
Religiosity    -0.0012  -0.0185  -0.0352* -0.0296 
     (0.0178) (0.0277) (0.0163) (0.0270) 
Motivational Attitudes 
Ideology    -0.0475* -0.1766*** -0.0557*** -0.1276*** 
     (0.0191) (0.0325) (0.0145) (0.0225) 
Political Interest    0.3373***  0.6011***  0.3658***  0.6471*** 
     (0.0423)  (0.0519) (0.0356) (0.0516) 
Systems Support 
Government Confidence  -0.0411  -0.20297* -0.0896# -0.2400** 
     (0.0577) (0.0796) (0.0465) (0.0884) 
Social Trust     0.0504   0.0730   0.2739***  0.4180*** 
     (0.0850) (0.1273) (0.0721) (0.1241) 
Political Behavior 
Party Member     0.1597   0.5345***  0.0967   0.4706*** 
     (0.1357) (0.1470) (0.1384) (0.1342) 
Labor Member     0.1617#  0.8203***  0.2431**  0.8430*** 
     (0.0949) (0.0952) (0.0769) (0.1173) 
Constant      1.6157***  0.7246   0.2939  -1.9343*** 
 
N      26,775   26,775   26,435   26,435 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses with the excluded year set to 2008. 





Figure 5.1 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF DEMONSTRATING   Figure 5.2 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF DEMONSTRATING  




Figure 5.3 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF BOYCOTTING   Figure 5.4 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF BOYCOTTING  






















































































         
  
Figure 5.5 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF DEMONSTRATING       Figure 5.6 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF DEMONSTRATING 
IN HIGH FREEDOM COUNTRIES BY RISK ACCEPTANCE    IN LOW FREEDOM COUNTRIES BY RISK ACCEPTANCE 
 
        
 
  
Figure 5.7 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF BOYCOTTING      Figure 5.8 MARGINAL PROBABILITY OF BOYCOTTING 




































































































This chapter builds on previous literature by considering how risk acceptance and system 
of government influence individuals’ decision to protest. I find that the risk accepting are much 
more likely to report a willingness to protest in non-democracies, a ratio of 2:1 for the most risk 
accepting, and more likely to report protesting in the past. Whereas the least risk accepting among 
us are highly unlikely to challenge the status quo of a non-democratic regime, the most risk 
accepting are willing to sacrifice life and limb to rectify perceived political injustices. Whether 
motivated by uncertainty or excitement, risk-accepting individuals receive a psychological payoff 
from challenging their government.  
These findings have far-reaching theoretical and practical implications. Low risk-accepting 
individuals may be hesitant to challenge their government using nontraditional political 
participation techniques, but the risk accepting are more than willing to take their place. On the 
one hand, countries with small risk-accepting populations may provide non-democratic 
governments more flexibility and stability to enact repressive policies because most individuals 
choose to avoid risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It should come as little surprise, then, that non-
democratic governments enforce repressive policies with impunity given that the effectiveness of 
protesting is contingent upon citizen participation. On the other hand, countries with large risk-
accepting populations may be more resilient in their pursuit of government accountability. 
Governments in countries with highly risk-accepting populations are likely less repressive and 
grant more concessions to their citizens because protests are often successful in achieving their 
intended goals (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).  
This chapter adds to an important line of protest literature, but more questions remain. 





of risk-accepting individuals? Does freedom of speech, freedom to protest, severity of repression, 
or other liberties influence whether the risk accepting participate in protests? Additionally, scholars 
should consider whether and how immigration of risk-accepting individuals from non-democracies 






CHAPTER 6. RISK ACCEPTANCE AND REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S. HOUSE 
 
In the previous two chapters I laid out a theoretical framework for how risk acceptance 
may influence the decision to participate in politics. The weak findings in Chapter 4 suggested that 
high levels of risk acceptance decrease the likelihood of voting in compulsory voting countries 
relative to their less risk-accepting counterparts by 4.5 percentage points. I also found strong 
evidence in Chapter 5 that the highly risk accepting are twice as likely to participate in political 
protests in non-democratic countries, though this effect was much weaker in democracies, relative 
to their less risk-accepting counterparts. In this chapter I continue the investigation of risk 
acceptance’s effect on political actors by considering how risk acceptance influences the behavior 
of political elites at the federal level. The lack of reliable survey data at the federal level makes 
this a daunting but fruitful investigation. Indeed, the lack of risk acceptance and political elite 
scholarly work makes the present chapter even more profitable if not challenging.   
 
An Introduction to Risk and Representation 
Theories of legislator decision making argue that political elites make decisions to reduce 
their electoral risks and other potential costs. When the costs are low legislators tend to make 
riskier political decisions (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Rohde, 1979). Legislator decision 
making is a strategically risk- and cost-avoiding process. However, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence, despite wide theoretical acceptance, that considers a legislator’s acceptance of 
risk. Seminal studies argue that legislative decision making is a function of personal characteristics 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart, 2001; Cox & Poole, 2001; Hogan, 2008; Levitt, 1996; Snyder 
& Ting, 2003; Wright & Schaffner, 2002), institutional constructs (Carey et al., 2006; Wright, 





many other factors. Perhaps the most famous explanation for legislative decision making can be 
attributed to Mayhew (1974a), who argues that legislators are focused solely on reelection and that 
all other motivations are secondary.  
The purpose of the present chapter is to test whether a psychological predisposition to risk 
acceptance influences legislative decision making, and whether it can be detected amid other 
factors legislators consider when making political decisions. Risk acceptance is the extent to which 
an individual seeks out risky behaviors and is comfortable with uncertain outcomes (Ehrlich and 
Maestas 2010; Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002). Risk-accepting legislators make decisions that are 
systematically different to their less risk-accepting colleagues (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 
1987). The risk acceptance are generally comfortable with uncertainty, more likely to challenge 
the status quo, and willing to accept potential losses (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Ehrlich 
and Maestas 2010; Kam 2012; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kam and Simas 2012).   
Until recently, political scholars neglected the role of individuals’ acceptance of risk. There 
have been few empirical studies or theoretical advancements regarding how risk acceptance 
influences elected elites’ political behavior since Rohde’s (1979) findings that risk-accepting 
legislators are more likely to seek higher office. More recent scholarly work focuses primarily on 
citizen behavior.30 Kam (2012), for instance, finds risk-accepting citizens are more likely to attend 
political meetings, rallies, and sign petitions because they find participation exciting and novel.  
I find that the risk accepting are less likely to vote in compulsory countries in Chapter 4 
and that they are more likely to protest in nondemocracies in Chapter 5. Risk acceptance, then, 
may have a general effect on political decision making. By looking at legislator acceptance of risk 
                                                          





we can determine whether legislators are comfortable making risky decisions, similar to citizens, 
or if they prefer to choose a safe alternative.  
I consider three decisions where risk acceptance may influence legislator behavior: (1) 
alignment with party preferences, (2) alignment with constituent preferences, and (3) shirking, or 
skipping, their roll-call vote. I expect low risk-accepting legislators may be more likely to support 
their party because parties provide leadership positions and resources that help with reelection 
campaigns (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Heberlig, Hetherington, & Larson, 2006). In this context, 
ignoring the party is a challenge to the status quo and increases electoral uncertainty. I also expect 
low risk-accepting legislators may be more likely to follow their constituents’ preferences. 
Ignoring constituent preferences is a challenge to the status quo and may jeopardize future vote 
share (Brady, Canes-Wrone & Cogan, 2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Erikson & 
Wright, 2000). Either scenario involves a degree of risk, has the potential to challenge the status 
quo, and may increase the uncertainty of reelection. Finally, I consider whether and how legislator 
preferences impact their ideology. That is, are low risk-accepting legislators more ideologically 
conservative? Theories of citizen behavior suggest the risk low risk accepting are more likely to 
be ideologically conservative and identify as Republican, while the risk accepting are more liberal 
and aligned with the Democratic Party (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2012). Can we expect 
legislators to exhibit a similar relationship? 
  I test the role of risk on legislative decision making with a novel measure of risk 
acceptance. I develop a novel measure of risk for political elites that, unlike existing measures, is 
focused on an additive index of risk acceptance and is not limited to binary measures (Abramson, 
Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Kam, 2012; Rohde, 1979). I use the measure to predict legislative 





decision making is based not only on factors like experience and money, which is shown to impact 
their behavior (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Carey et al., 2006; Heberlig & Larson, 2005; 
Mayhew, 1974a; Munger, 1988), but also on their acceptance of risk. I find that risk-accepting 
legislators are less ideologically conservative than the mean of their party and more likely to follow 
the preferences of their party. I find no evidence to suggest risk acceptance influences following 
constituent preferences or vote-shirking.  
A common foundation of representative democracy is that citizens elect leaders to 
represent their concerns (Fenno, 1978). If, however, the low risk accepting are more likely to 
ignore the preferences of their constituents, then risk acceptance may influence the representative 
nature of government. By ignoring the preferences of their constituents, low risk-accepting 
legislators in turn may have lower vote shares in future elections or contribute to more elite 
polarization and political conflict. The findings indicate that not only may risk acceptance 
influence the policies proposed, but also the cooperation between the parties.  
 
Party Preferences  
Legislators make decisions every day in office. Sometimes they listen to the opinions of 
their constituents while other times they follow the preferences of interest groups, party leaders, 
or their self (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Kingdon, 1989; Nyhan et al., 2012). Sometimes the 
preferences of these factions are aligned, other times they are in opposition. A legislator must 
decide which factions to lend their support and weigh the potential negative consequences of 
making the wrong decision with the potential benefits of making the right decision (Canes-Wrone, 





Literature suggests that legislators are influenced by their party (Kingdon, 1989; Matthews 
& Stimson, 1975; Ray, 1982; Songer et al., 1986). Constituents punish legislators who vote against 
their preferences (Nyhan et al., 2012), and parties in turn shield legislators from electoral fallout 
when they cast controversial votes (Aldrich & Rohde, 1997). Parties give legislators critical 
monetary support to combat increasing reelection costs and electoral uncertainty (Jacobson, 2004). 
Party leaders provide access to fundraising networks (Wright, 2000) and increase redistributed 
funds from fellow legislators (Heberlig & Larson, 2005). Parties also help their members beyond 
campaign resources. For example, following party preferences may lead to committee 
appointments or leadership positions (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Heberlig, 
Hetherington, & Larson, 2006; Hogan, 2008; Smith, 2000). Ambitious legislators will also benefit 
from good standing with the party when they run for higher office. Simply put, parties reward 
loyalty (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2006) find party leaders 
are more likely to reward legislators who are “ideologically like-minded members” rather than 
“ideologically dissimilar members” (p. 992). Legislators sometimes follow the preferences of their 
party even when doing so threatens their reelection (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; 
Rohde, 1991). Despite the advantages of party alignment, legislators will sometimes stray from 
their party.  
Following the party in some ways may decrease electoral uncertainty but it can also lead 
to unease with constituents. For example, “voters are not punishing elected representatives for 
being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan” (Carson et al., 2010, p. 598).  
Although other factions may be able to withdraw or lend vital resources for reelection, constituents 
ultimately have the unique power to decide who stays in office and who goes. Indeed, voting out 





Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Carson et al., 2010). Ultimately, legislators may stray from the 
preferences of their party to avoid electoral defeat (Hutchings, 2003). Because the risk accepting 
are comfortable with uncertainty and more likely to challenge the status quo, we should expect 
their decision making to vary compared to other members of Congress. This leads to the first 
hypothesis. Hypothesis 6.1: There is a positive relationship between risk acceptance and ignoring 
party preferences.  
I also consider how a legislator’s risk acceptance may influence their political ideology. 
Previous studies find risk-accepting citizens tend to have a liberal ideology and identify as 
Democrats (Kam, 2012; Kam & Simas, 2010). Although these studies focus on citizen ideology, 
we should expect a similar relationship for members of Congress. Under this theoretical 
framework we should expect risk-accepting legislators to be less ideologically conservative and 
identify as Republicans. This may explain why ideological moderates are less likely to run for 
office in the modern Congress (Thomsen, 2014). This leads to the second hypothesis. Hypothesis 
6.2: There is a negative relationship between risk acceptance and ideological conservatism.  
 
District Preferences 
Parties are not the only political actors that provide benefits to legislators. Unsurprisingly, 
legislators are willing to abandon their party for constituent support (Mayhew, 1974a; Fenno, 
1978). The consequences of ignoring constituent preferences are vast. Legislators lose a greater 
electoral vote share the more ideologically partisan their roll-call vote (Brady, Canes-Wrone & 
Cogan, 2000; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Erikson & Wright, 2000), challengers are 





1985; Jacobson, 2004), and higher-quality challengers are more likely to enter the electoral race 
when legislators ignore the preferences of their district (Jacobson & Kernell, 1983).  
Downs’ (1957) spatial theory argues that a voter has an ideal policy preference point and 
policies that are further from this point are less preferred than policies closer to the ideal point. 
When legislators move further from the preference point of constituents they are taking electoral 
risks because voters will punish legislators who ignore their preferences (Abramowitz, 1988; 
Johannes & McAdams, 1981; McAdams & Johannes, 1987; 1988; Whitby & Bledsoe, 1986). 
Therefore, it does not strain credulity that legislators are going to follow the preferences of their 
district to reduce their reelection uncertainty. Indeed, incumbents often lose office if they deviate 
too far from the preferences of their constituents (Miller & Stokes, 1963). This relationship is 
further exaggerated when constituent preferences are salient. Legislators will pay particularly close 
attention to the preferences of their constituents on highly salient votes (Bianco, 1994; Jackson & 
Kingdon, 1992; Matthews & Stimson, 1975) to avoid constituent discontent (Nyhan et al., 2012). 
Legislators who are willing to vote out of step with their district are accepting greater potential for 
electoral defeat. Why do some legislators stray from the preferences of their district?  
It may seem counterintuitive for legislators to stray from the preferences of the district 
given the power of constituents to choose who stays and who leaves office. However, there are 
determinants of roll-call voting behavior other than electoral consequences (Kingdon, 1989), such 
as personal (Bianco, Spence, & Wilkerson, 1996) or party preferences (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; 
Cox & Poole, 2002). For example, the trustee-delegate dichotomy argues that some districts entrust 
their legislator to make decisions on their behalf with little concern about electoral accountability 
(Fearon, 1999). Trustees are given relatively strong autonomy to make decisions for their district 





to stray from the preferences of their district when they are no longer concerned with reelection 
(Herrick et al., 1994). Carey et al. (2006) find that “term-limited legislators become less beholden 
to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns” (p. 105). 
Without the threat of reelection legislators may stray from the preferences of their district. When 
legislators stray from the preferences of their constituents they increase the uncertainty of 
reelection (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002). Therefore, we should expect risk-accepting 
legislators to ignore the preferences of their constituents at higher rates because they are 
comfortable increasing electoral uncertainty. This leads to the third hypothesis. Hypothesis 6.3: 
There is a positive relationship between risk acceptance and ignoring district preferences. 
 
Vote Shirking 
The third choice is shirking their roll-call vote. I expect that risk-accepting legislators may 
be less likely to shirk, or skip, roll-call votes. On the one hand skipping votes may lead to reprisals 
from constituents and challengers may use their absence to mount political attacks (Figlio, 2000; 
Wright, 1993). Missing roll-call votes can potentially increase the electoral uncertainty of 
legislators because challengers are quick to let constituents know when their legislator is absent. 
In the recent Republican Presidential debate, candidate Jeb Bush attacked the voting record of 
Florida Senator Marco Rubio saying, “You should be showing up to work.”  
On the other hand, shirking one’s vote allows legislators to avoid uncertainty that may 
come from controversial legislation. Legislators who vote on controversial bills are willing to 
accept potentially negative consequences from their constituents and increase electoral 





rates. This leads to the fourth and final hypothesis. Hypothesis 6.4: There is a negative relationship 
between risk acceptance and vote shirking.  
I include aggregated and separate models for Republicans and Democrats in the analyses 
that follow. I do not expect different relationships between Democrats and Republicans given that 
risk acceptance lowers ideological conservatism and increases liberalism. However, the 
substantive effects may vary by party. For instance, highly risk-accepting Republicans may show 
more liberalism than low risk-accepting Democrats.  
 
Data and Method of Analysis 
 I use the measure of risk acceptance outlined in chapter 3 as the main predictive variable: 
Risk Acceptance. Recall that Risk Acceptance is measured as the predicted values of a legislator 
winning their first election to Congress. Therefore, legislators with a high probability of losing 
their first election are considered risk accepting. I create a new measure of risk acceptance because 
political scholars currently do not have an additive index of risk acceptance for political elites and 
current measures of risk are limited to binary measures (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1987; Kam, 
2012; Rohde, 1979).  
To test hypothesis 6.1 and 6.2, I use the Poole and Rosenthal (1997) DW-Nominate Scores 
(DW-NOM). The DW-NOM provide a commonly used measure to examine the effects of 
legislator ideology on district gerrymandering (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2009) and legislator 
policy preferences (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2013). More importantly, scholars use the 
absolute value of DW-NOM as a measure of party loyalty (Carson et al., 2010). I adapt a similar 
approach by considering the difference of DW-NOM, which provides the distance of legislator 





value of DW-NOM, which provides the direction of legislator ideology relative to the party mean 
to test the second hypothesis.  
I use DW-NOM to create three dependent variables: Ignore Party Preferences (Hypothesis 
6.1), Ideological Conservatism (Hypothesis 6.2), and Legislator Ideology (Hypothesis 6.3). Ignore 
Party Preferences is the absolute value between a legislator’s party mean DW-NOM and his or 
her DW-NOM, but all negative numbers are multiplied by -1 to eliminate direction. Therefore, 
larger values represent greater deviation from the party mean, or ignoring mean party preferences, 
not the ideological preference of the legislator. Values range from a low of 0 to a high of 0.61with 
a mean score of 0.12, where a score of 0 means the legislator is perfectly aligned with his or her 
party preferences.  
To test the ideological preference of legislators I include a second dependent variable, 
Ideological Conservatism, which is the absolute value between the legislators’ mean party DW-
NOM and their DW-NOM. Larger positive numbers indicate legislators’ ideological conservatism 
is higher than the party mean and larger negative numbers indicate legislators’ ideological 
liberalism is higher than the party mean. Values range from a low of -0.61 to a high of 0.56 with a 
mean score of 0. In other words, legislators are between -0.61 DW-NOM more liberal than their 
party mean to 0.56 DW-NOM more conservative than their party mean.  
Finally, Legislator Ideology is the legislators’ DW-NOM score. Larger positive numbers 
indicate legislators are more ideologically conservative, and larger negative numbers indicate they 
are more ideologically liberal. Values range from a low of -0.70 to a high of 1.3 with a mean score 
of 0.12.31  
                                                          





I also use the Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) multilevel regression with 
poststratification (MRP) district ideology scores to test hypothesis 6.3. The MRP scores provide 
an estimate of constituent preferences at the congressional level (Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2014) 
and a robust estimate of mass public partisan preferences (Lelkes, Sood, & Iyengar, 2017). 
Although some studies rely on district demographics (Hogan 2008) or presidential vote shares 
(Shor, 2010; Shor & McCarty, 2011) as a proxy of district ideology, these measures are vulnerable 
to “home-state effects, regional biases, and heterogeneity” effects that decrease validity and 
reliability of district preferences (Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013, p. 337).  
I code District Ideology as the Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) MRP district ideology 
scores. Higher scores indicate districts are more ideologically conservative, and lower scores 
indicate more liberal ones. The model includes an interaction between Risk Acceptance and 
District Ideology to test whether the risk accepting are less likely to follow district preferences. 
The dependent variables are linear and are thus analyzed using Ordinal Least Squares regression. 
I include several theoretically important variables from the literature to control for 
legislative behavior such as leadership positions and safety of the district (Ansolabehere & Jones, 
2010; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Erikson & Wright, 2001). Scholars find that legislator 
decision making is influenced by being in the Majority Party and being a Party Leader or Party 
Chair (Holbrook & Tidmarch, 1993; Pritchard, 1992; Rothenberg & Sanders, 1999; Van Dunk, 
1997).  I control for legislators who are more likely to ignore constituent preferences in safe 
districts and when leaving office with Vulnerable, Margin of Victory, and Leave Office to (Carey 
et al., 2006; Jones, 2003; Mayhew, 1974; Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000). Legislators who are new 
to Congress or have little political experience are more likely to be influenced by interest groups 





1974a; Munger, 1988), which I account for Prior Experience. A detailed description of control 




 For the analyses that follow, recall from Chapter 3 that Risk Acceptance ranges from the 
lowest value of 0.36 to the highest of 99.88 and the Rohde Measure is a binary variable with 
respondents coded either a 1 or 0.32 Results from the main analysis are in Table 6.1. Risk 
Acceptance (b= -0.0003, p<.05) has a negative and statistically significant effect on Ignore Party 
Preferences, controlling for all other factors in the model. A one-unit increase in risk acceptance 
decreases the likelihood of ignoring party preferences by -0.0003 DW-NOM. In Figure 6.1, I graph 
the results with all other variables set to their mean. Moving from the lowest risk-acceptance score 
(0.36) to the highest (99.88) reduces the likelihood of ignoring party preferences by -0.03 DW-
NOM. In other words, the most risk-accepting legislators are 23% less likely to ignore party 
preferences than the least risk accepting. This finding is in direct opposition to hypothesis 6.1 and 
somewhat unexpected. However, following party preferences can be a risky proposition. Consider 
for instance that constituents punish legislators for being too partisan (Carson et al., 2010) and 
following the party may lead to electoral defeat (Hutchings, 2003). Although parties provide 
resources that help with reelection campaigns (Jacobson, 2004; Heberlig & Larson, 2005; Wright, 
2000) and provide leadership positions (Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002; Heberlig, 
Hetherington, & Larson, 2006; Hogan, 2008; Smith, 2000), the empirical evidence indicates the 
                                                          
32 A score of 0.36 represents lower risk acceptance and a score of 99.88 represents higher risk 





risk accepting are more willing to risk reelection by following party preferences relative to less 
risk-accepting members.  
I include the same analysis using the Rohde measure of risk acceptance in the second 
column of Table 6.1. The Rohde measure of risk acceptance fails to reach traditional levels of 
statistical significance (b= -0.003, p= 0.77). The Rohde measure of risk acceptance does not appear 
to have any influence on party preferences. Note that the Rohde measure also has a negative 
coefficient suggesting that risk acceptance decreases the likelihood of ignoring party preferences.   
 While I make no hypotheses regarding differences in party affiliation and risk acceptance 
on party loyalty, I estimate the effect of risk acceptance on ignoring party preferences separately 
for Democrats and Republicans in the third and fourth columns of Table 6.1. Risk-accepting 
Democrats (b= -0.0003, p= .061) and Republicans (b= -0.0008, p= .079) are less likely to ignore 
the preferences of their respective party relative to the low risk accepting, although this effect is 
statistically insignificant with a two-tailed test. Risk acceptance, then, seems to influence party 
loyalty regardless of party affiliation. Interestingly, the effect of risk acceptance on party loyalty 
is stronger for Republicans than Democrats. This may be because the risk accepting tend to identify 
as Democrats and are generally more liberal than other members of society (Kam, 2012). 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that risk acceptance would have a larger substantive effect on 
Republicans.  This is highlighted further below in Table 6.2. 
In the first column of Table 6.2, Risk Acceptance (b= -0.0006, p<.01), has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on Ideological Conservatism, controlling for all other factors in the 
model. A one-unit increase in risk acceptance decreases the ideological conservatism of legislators 
by -0.0006 DW-NOM relative to the mean of their party. I graph the results with all other variables 





(99.88) reduces legislator conservatism by a total of -0.08 DW-NOM. In other words, the most 
risk-accepting legislators are 60% less ideologically conservative than the mean of their party 
compared to the least risk-accepting legislators. This provides support for hypothesis 6.2. 
Legislators are less conservative than their party mean as their level of risk acceptance increases. 
Once again, I conduct the same analysis using the Rohde measure of risk acceptance and include 
it in the second column of Table 6.2. The Rohde measure of risk acceptance fails to reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance (b= -0.02, b= 0.21) and does not appear to have any 
influence on legislator ideology relative to the mean of the party.  
I estimate the effect of risk acceptance on ideological conservatism separately for 
Democrats and Republicans in the third and fourth columns of Table 6.2. Risk Acceptance 
influences the ideological conservatism of Democrats (b= -0.0009, p< .001) and Republicans (b= 
0.002, p< .001) at highly statistically significant levels controlling for all other factors in the 
models. A one-unit increase in risk acceptance decreases the ideological conservatism of 
Democrats by -0.0009 DW-NOM. However, a one-unit increase in risk acceptance increases the 
ideological conservatism of Republicans relative to the mean position of their party. This is a 
highly unexpected finding. Indeed, previous literature finds that risk acceptance increases 
ideological liberalism, not conservatism (Kam, 2012).  
This finding may be due to two factors. One, risk acceptance may influence the behavior 
of legislators differently than the mass public. For example, literature has not considered how risk 
acceptance influences the ideology of political elites at the federal level. A second explanation 
may be that risk acceptance increases ideological extremity rather than ideological liberalism. Put 





increase in ideological conservatism for risk-accepting Republicans indicates that the risk 
accepting are at the polar extremes of their respective party.  
This finding has broad theoretical implications. Given that Congressional Democrats are 
becoming more liberal and Republicans more conservative, this may be due to an increase in risk-
accepting legislators taking office. When we couple this finding with the results from Table 6.1 
we begin to see a pattern emerge for the risk accepting. They are more likely to follow the party 
while at the same time they are more ideologically extreme than the mean of their party. The risk 






Table 6.1 OLS Regression of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Ignoring Party Preferences, H6.1    
 
    Risk Acceptance          Rohde Measure Democrats         Republicans           
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance -0.0003*  ---------- -0.0003#  -0.0008# 
   (0.0002)  ---------- (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
Rohde Measure ----------  -0.003  ----------  ---------- 
   ----------  (0.01)  ----------  ---------- 
Party   -0.01   -0.03** ----------  ---------- 
   (0.01)    (0.01)   ----------  ----------  
Vulnerable    0.05***    0.04**  0.06***  -0.03 
(0.01)   (0.02)  (0.01)   (0.03)  
Party Chair    0.01    0.01   0.02    0.01 
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.02)   (0.02) 
Party Leader   0.03                0.02   0.03     0.01  
   (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.04) 
Majority Party   0.002    0.002   0.01    -0.02 
   (0.009)  (0.009) (0.01)   (0.02) 
Margin of Victory  0.0004*   0.001**  0.0002    0.0008* 
(0.01)   (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
Leave Office   0.009     0.008   0.01    0.01  
   (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02) 
Prior Experience  0.02*    0.01#  -0.01    0.05*** 
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Congress 109  -0.01   -0.02  ----------  ----------  
   (0.01)   (0.01)  ----------  ---------- 
Congress 110  -0.01   -0.01  -0.01   -0.0098 
   (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02)  
Constant    0.11***   0.11***   0.10***   0.106*** 
   (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.02)   (0.018) 
 
Adj. R2   0.03    0.02    0.05    0.06 
N     593    584    355    238 
____________________________________________________________________________  












Table 6.2 OLS Regression of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Ideological Conservatism, H6.2 
 
       
      Risk Acceptance   Rohde Measure       Democrats          Republicans 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance -0.0006**       ----------  -0.0009***   0.002*** 
    (0.0002)      ----------  (0.0002)  (0.0007) 
Rohde Measure ----------               -0.021  ----------  ----------  
   ----------                 (0.02)  ----------  ---------- 
Party    0.03*         0.01  ----------  ---------- 
   (0.02)        (0.01)  ----------  ---------- 
Vulnerable   -0.09***       -0.10***  -0.11***   0.06 
(0.02)        (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.05) 
Party Chair   -0.02        -0.02   0.01   -0.08** 
   (0.02)        (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.03) 
Party Leader   0.01        -0.0002  -0.05    0.05  
(0.02)        (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.06) 
Majority Party   0.02#         0.02#   0.04*    0.02 
   (0.01)        (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.03) 
Margin of Victory  0.001***        0.001***   0.001***   0.0001 
   (0.0003)       (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)  
Leave Office   0.004        -0.0001  -0.07*    0.04 
(0.02)        (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.03) 
Prior Experience -0.03*        -0.03*  -0.009   -0.06* 
   (0.01)        (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02) 
Congress 109  -0.01        -0.01   ----------  ---------- 
   (0.02)        (0.02)  ----------  ---------- 
Congress 110  -0.01        -0.01  -0.01    0.006 
(0.01)        (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.03)  
Constant   -0.02        -0.03*   0.01   -0.05# 
(0.02)        (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.03) 
 
Adj. R2   0.15         0.14   0.36    0.07 
N     593         584   355    238 
____________________________________________________________________________  







        Figure 6.1 Risk Acceptance and Ideological Deviation From  
        Party Mean 
 
 
         Figure 6.2 Risk Acceptance and Legislator Conservatism 
 
 
Next, I turn to the results of risk acceptance’s impact on whether legislators adhere to their 
districts’ preferences, which I outline in Table 6.3. Neither Risk Acceptance (b= 0.0001, p= 0.85) 
nor the Rohde measure of risk acceptance (b= -0.004, p= 0.93) reach traditional levels of statistical 




































district preferences than those who have a lower tolerance for risk. It is important to note that we 
cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the null results are due to measurement error. The 
lack of congruent measures between legislator and district ideology make direct comparisons 
difficult.  
There are statistically significant relationships once I estimate the effect of risk acceptance 
on district preferences separately for Democrats and Republicans in the third and fourth columns 
of Table 6.3. The interaction terms between district ideology and risk acceptance influences 
following constituent preferences for Democrats (b= 0.002, p< .001) and Republicans (b= -0.01, 
p< .01) at highly statistically significant levels controlling for all other factors in the models. The 
lowest risk-accepting Democrats in liberal districts have a more liberal DW-NOM score (-0.55) 
than the highest risk-accepting Democrats in liberal districts (-0.45). Likewise, the lowest risk-
accepting Republicans in conservative districts have a more conservative DW-NOM score (0.76) 
than the highest risk-accepting Republicans in conservative districts (0.72). This is an important 
theoretical and empirical distinction from previous literature. Risk-accepting legislators are 
generally more ideologically liberal than their less risk-accepting counterparts (See Table 6.2). 
Further, once we account for district ideology, low risk-accepting Democrats are more liberal than 
high risk-accepting Democrats, and low-risk-accepting Republicans are more conservative than 
high risk-accepting Republicans. Although we cannot determine whether the low risk accepting 
are more aligned with district preferences, we can conclude that the low risk accepting are more 
liberal in liberal districts and more conservative in conservative ones relative to highly risk-
accepting legislators.  
When we consider the evidence together from Table 6.1 and Table 6.3, the findings suggest 





less likely to follow district preferences relative to less risk-accepting Members of Congress. 
Theoretically, then, the results suggest that risk acceptance provides political parties with more 
power while limiting the power of constituents. Party leaders may possess more influence over the 
legislative process and the roll-call votes of the rank-and-file because MCs in leadership positions 
generally earn them by towing the party line. This would explain how House Republican leaders 
could pass the American Health Care Act with only 17% public approval in 2017. 
Finally, in Table 6.4 I report the effect of risk acceptance on legislator vote shirking.  Risk 
Acceptance (b= 0.0014, p= .83) has no effect on Vote Shirking. Even though the risk accepting are 
less ideologically conservative and follow the ideological base of the party at higher rates than 
those with low levels of risk acceptance, the limitations of Congressional institutions constrain 
even the most risk accepting. Legislators are willing to take some risks with their party and 
ideology, but ultimately the institution of Congress keeps legislators in check. In other words, risk-
accepting legislators are not willing to go so far as to commit political suicide by not even showing 
up to work. Indeed, it may be that the ideological extremity of the risk accepting encourages 











Table 6.3  OLS Regression of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Legislator Ideology by District Preferences, H6.3 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Risk Acceptance         Rohde Measure           Democrats         Republicans 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
District Ideology x Risk Acceptance       0.0001  ----------   0.002***  -0.01** 
(0.01)   ----------  (0.0006)  (0.004) 
Risk Acceptance     0.0005  ----------   0.001***  -0.0004 
(0.02)   ----------  (0.0002)  (0.0008) 
District Ideology x Rohde Measure  ----------  -0.004   ----------  ---------- 
      ----------   (0.05)   ----------  ---------- 
Rohde Measure    ----------   0.07***  ----------  ---------- 
      ----------  (0.01)   ----------  ---------- 
District Ideology      0.28***   0.30***   0.16***   0.45*** 
      (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.12) 
Party       -0.91***  -0.90***  ----------  ---------- 
      (0.02)   (0.02)   ----------  ---------- 
Caucasian       0.02     0.01    0.03   ---------- 
      (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   ---------- 
Male        0.04*     0.04*    0.02    0.06 
      (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.04) 
Prior Presidential Vote    -0.0002  -0.00009  -0.0007#   0.0003 
      (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  
Congress 109     -0.03*   -0.03*    0.0009  -0.06* 
      (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.03) 
Congress 110     -0.01   -0.01   0.00004  -0.03 
      (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.03) 
Constant       0.58***   0.56***  -0.39***   0.58*** 
      (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.06) 
 
Adj. R2       0.94     0.94    0.57    0.12  
N          488    479    287    201 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________  





Table 6.4 The Effect of Risk Acceptance on Vote 
    Shirking, H6.4 
 
___________________________________________ 
     




Risk Acceptance   0.0014   
    (0.0065)   
Party    -0.3548   
    (0.3163)   
Vulnerable     0.2436   
    (0.5477)   
Party Chair     1.1449***    
    (0.3552)   
Party Leader     0.3591                     
    (0.5400)   
Majority Party    0.0033    
    (0.2911)   
Self-Contributions   0.0551**      
    (0.0193)   
Citizen Contributions    0.0080     
    (0.0084)   
Margin of Victory    0.0263***    
    (0.0062)   
Leave Office     0.0737       
    (0.4354)   
Prior Experience    0.0103      
    (0.3167)   
Congress 109    0.3509     
    (0.3032)   
Congress 110    0.6389*     
    (0.3175)   
Constant     2.3138***       
(0.6418)  
Adj. R2      0.07 
N       582 
____________________________________________ 
Notes: OLS Regression with standard errors in parentheses.  










The findings in the main analyses support the notion that legislators’ propensity for risk 
acceptance influences their decision making. High risk-accepting lawmakers are willing to move 
toward their party’s position despite potential negative electoral consequences (Carson et al., 2010; 
Hutchings, 2003). This suggests that the risk accepting may be more likely to follow party 
preferences over their constituents’ ideal policy preference points. The risk accepting are also more 
ideologically liberal than the mean of their party, though they do not ignore their constituents’ 
preferences at higher rates. The inclusion of risk acceptance in theoretical models of representation 
adds a wrinkle to our current understanding of the delegate-trustee relationship. 
If party loyalty is a function of risk acceptance, then party leaders may be in an 
advantageous position of power to push their legislative agenda. By contrast, the risk accepting 
may be taking risks by following party preferences that may lead to uncertain electoral outcomes. 
Risk-accepting lawmakers may be overestimating the possible benefits of following party 
preferences relative to other factions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), or they may be trustees who 
make decisions with little concern for electoral accountability (Fearon, 1999). Rather than 
demonstrating loyalty to constituents, the risk accepting are accountable to the party. This is not 
to suggest legislators are political kamikazes willing to risk their tenure in government by ignoring 
relevant political factions such as constituents. Indeed, the statistically insignificant results would 
suggest otherwise. They may, however, be political daredevils who view uncertain outcomes, such 
as following the party, in a more positive light compared to those with low levels of risk 
acceptance.   
Another important theoretical implication is the role of risk acceptance on legislators’ 





there is a 60% reduction in ideological conservatism relative to the mean of the party. Risk 
acceptance, then, may help explain why ideological moderates do not run for office in the modern 
Congress (Thomsen, 2014). When one considers the risks associated with winning public office, 
such as the time and money required to run, and the potential for controversy and constant public 
scrutiny in office, even the decision to run for office seems risky. Given that highly risk-accepting 
legislators are more ideologically liberal than their less risk-accepting counterparts, risk 
acceptance may not explain why Republicans are becoming more conservative (McCarty, Poole, 
& Rosenthal, 2006).  It may, however, explain why Congress is more ideologically extreme than 
in the past (Brewer, 2005; Mann & Ornstein, 2016). The extreme ideological differences between 
the high and low risk accepting suggests that we should expect further ideological conflict and 
polarization in Congress. 
Although constituents ultimately have the final say who stays in office and who goes, the 
party may provide risk-accepting legislators with perceived benefits that outweigh the perceived 
threat of ignoring constituents. These findings would suggest that the power of the party is 
increasing. If the risk accepting are more likely to follow party preferences, then party leaders may 
possess more influence over the legislative process and the roll-call votes of the rank-and-file. This 
would explain, for example, how House Republicans were able to pass their American Health Care 
Act with only 17% public approval.  
Finally, risk acceptance has no effect on vote shirking. Although the risk accepting are 
more likely to follow party preferences and, they are not any more, or less, likely to show up for 
work than other members. Varying levels of risk acceptance may influence legislators to take some 
liberties when it comes to representation but ultimately, they are unwilling to go to the extreme of 





constituents and challengers may use their absence to mount political attacks (Figlio, 2000; Wright, 
1993).  
These conclusions are the starting points for most Congressional theories of representation 
but the inclusion of legislator risk acceptance adds an additional wrinkle to scholarly 
understanding. The findings demonstrate that although legislators are risk accepting, the status quo 
of legislator preferences are different than previous theories may predict. This chapter is only the 
first step in understanding what legislators deem to be risky behavior and how it influences the 
normative implications of democratic representation. Indeed, many more questions remain about 
policy implications and the actions of other political actors. For example, are risk-accepting 
political actors more likely to support marijuana policies, declare war, or change economic safety 
nets? How are judicial opinions influenced by their acceptance of risk? Are risk-accepting judges 
more likely to overturn national precedent to avoid changing the status quo? The findings in the 
present chapter indicate that policy positions of the risk accepting may be a fruitful and robust area 











CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Does risk acceptance influence the decision making of political actors? The simple answer 
is maybe. Risk-accepting citizens are less likely to vote in compulsory voting countries but more 
likely to protest in nondemocracies. Risk-accepting legislators in the U.S. House are more likely 
to follow the preferences of their party and they are less ideologically conservative than the mean 
of their party. However, the risk accepting are not any more likely to ignore constituent preferences 
or shirk their vote.  
In Chapter 4 I hypothesized that there was a negative relationship between risk acceptance 
and voter turnout. I found support for this hypothesis. The findings in Chapter 4 indicate that the 
most risk-accepting citizens vote ~4.5 percentage points lower than the least risk accepting. While 
this is a substantively weaker finding than expected, consider that compulsory voting increases 
turnout around 10% (Panagopoulos, 2008; Singh, 2011). Risk acceptance, then, decreases the 
effects of compulsory voting by roughly half of the intended effect. This effect is limited to only 
countries with both high sanctions and enforcement. I find no evidence that the risk accepting are 
any more (less) likely to vote in countries with compulsory voting that do not either enforce or 
implement strong sanctions for abstaining. Ironically, as the sanctions and enforcement increase 
in severity, leading to an increase in turnout, so too does the likelihood that the risk accepting will 
abstain.  
In Chapter 5 I hypothesized that there was a positive relationship between risk acceptance 
and protesting. I found very strong support for this hypothesis. The findings in Chapter 5 indicate 
that the most risk-accepting citizens are twice as likely to report a willingness to participate in 
future protests compared to the least risk-accepting members of society. Whereas risk acceptance 





demonstrating and boycotting. The most risk accepting are twice as likely to demonstrate and 
boycott compared to the least risk accepting. This represents an impressive substantive increase 
from 23.8% to 47.6% for individuals in nondemocracies who reported they might demonstrate, 
and from 16.6% to 43.8% for those who might boycott. The substantive effects are just as 
impressive for individuals who report past participation. Those with the lowest level of risk 
acceptance report a probability of past demonstration of ~11% compared to ~20% for the highest 
risk accepting. Likewise, risk acceptance increases past participation in boycotts from 3.7% to 
9.0% moving from the lowest to the highest level. However, the substantive findings for past 
participation is statistically insignificant.  
Recall that the purpose of Chapter 6 was two-fold. First, I wanted to establish a more 
accurate scaled measure of risk acceptance that could replace Rohde’s (1979) binary measure of 
risk. Multiple item indices are more representative of the mass public and reduce error that increase 
validity and reliability (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010). To create the scaled measure of risk acceptance 
I estimated the statistical probability that a legislator would win their first election to Congress. I 
considered factors that scholars find have a strong influence on the likelihood of a legislator 
winning office such as the prior presidential vote percentage, primary vote percentage, money 
spent campaigning, and whether the seat was open or had an incumbent (Born, 1981; Hogan, 2008; 
Jacobson, 2006). To test the validity and reliability of the new measure, I used a Chi-Square Test 
of Independence between Risk Acceptance and the Rohde measure. The result was statistically 
significant indicating that the variables were related, or not independent of each other. In other 
words, the two variables measured similar concepts and the relationship was moderate to strong. 
The two measures were also correlated at .47. Again, a correlation of .47 indicates a moderate 





an incumbent or for a seat that has been held by a member of the opposite party for at least two 
election cycles with 57% or more of the vote. These tests indicate strong evidence that Risk 
Acceptance and the Rohde measure are highly correlated and dependent upon one another. Given 
the findings, we can be confident that the proposed risk acceptance scale in Chapter 3 provides 
future scholars with a multiple item index with high validity and reliability.  
The second purpose of Chapter 6 was to use the risk acceptance scale to predict legislator 
decision making in the U.S. House. I hypothesized that there was a positive relationship between 
risk acceptance and ignoring the preferences of the party and constituents, and the willingness of 
legislators to shirk their vote. I also hypothesized that there was a negative relationship between 
risk acceptance and ideological conservatism. I found no support that the highly risk accepting are 
any more likely to ignore constituent preferences or shirk their vote compared to their less risk-
accepting colleagues. These results were statistically insignificant. I also did not find support that 
the highly risk accepting are more likely to ignore party preferences. Indeed, I found the opposite. 
Moving from the lowest risk-acceptance score to the highest reduced the likelihood of ignoring 
party preferences by -0.03 DW-NOM. The most risk-accepting legislators are 23% less likely to 
ignore party preferences than the least risk accepting. I did, however, find support for the 
hypothesis between risk acceptance and ideological conservatism. Moving from the lowest risk-
acceptance score (0.36) to the highest (99.88) reduces legislator conservatism by a total of -0.08 
DW-NOM. The most risk-accepting legislators are a very robust 60% less ideologically 
conservative than the mean of their party compared to the least risk-accepting legislators. Finally, 
the Rohde measure of risk acceptance does not appear to have any influence on party or constituent 






While I find support for four out of the seven proposed hypotheses, see Table 7.1 below, 
the lack of support for the final two hypotheses and opposite findings for hypothesis 6.1 paints an 
interesting picture for the risk accepting. On the one hand, the findings in Chapter 5 suggest that 
the risk accepting are more likely to protest and risk their safety. One could conclude that the risk 
accepting may be less concerned about potential physical or financial risks that come with 
participating in protests compared to other members of society. This conclusion is especially 
robust in non-democratic countries. On the other hand, the findings in Chapter 6 suggest that they 
are not willing to go to the political extreme to ignore the voices of their constituents. Why would 
risk-accepting citizens be willing to risk more than legislators? 
These conclusions may seem contradictory, or at a minimum counterintuitive, but they also 
highlight that risk acceptance is contextual.  While individuals may be willing to accept risk in one 
scenario, they may show little signs of accepting risk in another. Risk-accepting citizens may be 
willing to go to the extreme of risking financial or physical harm, but legislators may only be 
willing to go to the extreme of following party preferences. Some theories of representation also 
suggest that ignoring constituent preferences may not end a legislator’s career. Fearon (1999) 
argues that trustees make decisions for their district without considering the preferences of the 
district. Instead, citizens grant trustees autonomy to make decisions that are best for the district 
that may not directly follow the preferences of the majority. It is arguable that risk-accepting 
legislators are trustees given the findings in Chapter 6.  
By contrast, the political strategies between legislators and the mass public are similar 
insofar as both groups are willing to take risks to accomplish their political goals. For example, 





right perceived political injustices, and risk-accepting legislators follow the preferences of the 
party, presumably to seek higher office and leadership positions. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The theoretical consequences of these findings are numerous. First, compulsory voting 
laws may be less effective in compelling citizens to vote in countries with large risk-accepting 
populations. This is important given that the risk accepting are more likely to vote for challengers 
over incumbents (Kam & Simas, 2012). If the risk accepting are less likely to vote but more likely 
to vote for challengers, then governments may enjoy greater incumbency effects with compulsory 
voting laws. The lower participation rates for the risk accepting also suggests the government may 
be influenced to enact less risky policies since fewer risk acceptors participate in compulsory 
elections.  
Second, countries with low risk-accepting populations may provide non-democratic 
governments more flexibility and stability to enact repressive policies because most individuals 
are not willing to risk the consequences of defiance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Theoretically, 
governments in countries with highly risk-accepting populations are likely less repressive and 
grant more concessions to their citizens because protests are often successful in achieving their 
intended goals (Celestino & Gleditsch 2013; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008). 
Third, if party loyalty is a function of risk acceptance, then party leaders may be in an 
advantageous position of power to push their legislative agenda. By contrast, the risk accepting 
may be taking risks by following party preferences that may lead to uncertain electoral outcomes. 
Risk-accepting lawmakers may be overestimating the possible benefits of following party 





make decisions with little concern for electoral accountability (Fearon, 1999). Rather than 
demonstrating loyalty to constituents, the risk accepting are accountable to the party. This is not 
to suggest legislators are political kamikazes willing to risk their tenure in government by ignoring 
relevant political factions such as constituents. Indeed, the statistically insignificant results would 
suggest otherwise. They may, however, be political daredevils who view uncertain outcomes, such 
as following the party, in a more positive light compared to those with low levels of risk 
acceptance.   
Finally, when we compare the highest risk-accepting legislators to the lowest, there is a 
60% reduction in ideological conservatism relative to the mean of the party. Risk acceptance, then, 
may help explain why ideological moderates do not run for office in the modern Congress 
(Thomsen, 2014). When one considers the risks associated with winning public office, such as the 
time and money required to run, and the potential for controversy and constant public scrutiny in 
office, even the decision to run for office seems risky. Given that highly risk-accepting legislators 
are more ideologically liberal than their less risk-accepting counterparts, risk acceptance may not 
explain why Republicans are becoming more conservative (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006).  
It may, however, explain why Congress is more ideologically extreme than in the past (Brewer, 
2005; Mann & Ornstein, 2016). The extreme ideological differences between the high and low risk 
accepting suggests that we should expect further ideological conflict and polarization in Congress.  
 
Future Research 
 Where do we go from here? While this dissertation addressed several of the shortcomings 
in the risk acceptance literature, many future questions remain. I consider future research for each 





Next, I discuss future risk acceptance and voting research followed by other contexts of 
participation. Finally, I consider other ways that legislators may be influenced by their acceptance 
of risk. The major conclusion of this section is that scholars need more accurate and congruent 
measures of risk acceptance, and measures between political elites and their constituents.  
  
Measuring Risk Acceptance 
One of the major current shortcomings for studying risk behavior is the lack of congruent 
risk measures in the literature. In the past decade many of the major national surveys have included 
measures of risk acceptance. However, as this dissertation has shown, the availability of consistent 
measures leaves much to be desired. The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and 
the American National Election Study (ANES) have started including measures of risk acceptance, 
but the measures are not included consistently. The measures still vary by year and, more 
importantly, by question. While scholars have demonstrated that single-item measures of risk are 
valid and reliable (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010), consistent measures would provide scholars a 
uniform approach to studying risk behavior.  
Further, these surveys do not provide measures of risk acceptance for political elites at the 
federal level. Experimental studies have considered risk acceptance for legislators at the state level 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2015), but again these measures are inconsistent. The financial and logistical 
costs of surveying legislators in the U.S. House may prohibit more accurate measures of risk 
acceptance in the near future. In the meantime, additional improvements to proxy measures of risk 
acceptance for political elites at the federal level will provide scholars with more accurate 





risk acceptance for U.S. Congressman since Rhode’s seminal study in 1979. Scholars would do 
well to continue improving the risk acceptance measure in Chapter 3.    
 
Risk Acceptance and Voting 
Furthering the research between voting and risk acceptance may also provide scholars with 
a fruitful research agenda. In Chapter 4 I found some evidence that risk acceptance influences 
individual-level turnout. The sanctions and enforcement of compulsory voting systems provided 
an interesting theoretical wrinkle to Kam’s participation study in the United States. While she 
found no evidence that risk acceptance increases the likelihood of voting, I argued this was due to 
a lack of costs associated with voting in American elections. Kam (2012 argues voting is the 
fulfillment of civic duty and fulfilling the duty provides neither excitement nor novelty to the risk 
accepting. Her findings provide an interesting theoretical and empirical predicament. If risk 
acceptance has no effect on the likelihood of turning out to vote, does risk acceptance influence 
the reporting of whether one voted?  
The risk accepting are more likely to challenge the status quo, which is to fulfill one’s civic 
duty and vote (Kam 2012). Highly risk-accepting individuals may be more likely to report their 
abstention from the electoral process compared to those with low levels of risk acceptance, because 
highly risk-accepting individuals may not be concerned about being cast in a socially undesirable 
light. If, however, the status quo is to accurately report one’s vote, rather than simply reporting 
one’s vote, then the expected behavior of the risk accepting changes. In this scenario, highly risk-







Risk Acceptance and Protesting 
  In Chapter 5 I found very strong evidence that risk acceptance increases protesting 
activity. I used a dichotomous measure of democracy to test this relationship. Democracies are not 
dichotomous. Future research should consider which non-democratic institutions, political rights, 
or freedoms, influence the behavior of risk-accepting individuals. Does freedom of speech, 
freedom to protest, severity of repression, or other liberties influence whether the risk accepting 
participate in protests? I looked at some of these relationships briefly in the appendix but more in-
depth study is required. The Freedom House Index provides multiple detailed measures of freedom 
and liberties that scholars can use to more accurately understand what motivates the risk accepting 
to participate in protests.  
Scholars should also consider whether and how immigration of risk-accepting individuals 
from nondemocracies to democratic countries influences participation. Democratic and non-
democratic countries are inherently different. They differ in their institutions, policies, and goals. 
The findings in Chapter 5 indicate that the risk accepting are more likely to report a willingness to 
protest in nondemocracies. Does the strength of this relationship hold for immigrants? Because 
democracies provide citizens with other institutional avenues to express their displeasure with the 
government, risk-accepting immigrants from nondemocracies may conform to these democratic 
principles, such as voting, petitioning, and writing letters, rather than protesting.   
 
Risk Acceptance and Legislators 
 I found no evidence that risk-accepting legislators are any more (less) likely to follow 
district preferences compared to their less risk-accepting counterparts in Chapter 6. This may be 





improved over the past few years. Scholars, however, currently do not have congruent measures 
between political elites at the federal level and their constituents. Instead, I used the Tausanovitch 
and Warshaw (2013) measure of constituent ideology and the Poole and Rosenthal (2003) measure 
of legislator ideology to test whether legislators follow constituent preferences. The lack of 
congruent measures hinders substantive interpretations and estimate validity. Once we also include 
the proxy measure of risk acceptance from Chapter 3 to make predictions, the results become even 
more susceptible to error. Scholars would do well to continue their pursuit of more valid and 
reliable measures of ideology and risk.  
 Future research should look beyond legislators. How might judges interpret cases based on 
their acceptance of risk? Do highly risk-accepting political elites propose policies differently from 
their less risk-accepting counterparts? Although risk acceptance is highly correlated with party and 






Table 7.1 Review of Tested Hypotheses 
 
HYPOTHESES      HYPOTHESIZED        ACTUAL      SIGNIFICANT 
    DIRECTION     DIRECTION     
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: There is a negative relationship between   (-)    (-)   YES 
risk acceptance and turnout in compulsory voting countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: There is a positive relationship between   (+)    (+)   YES 
risk acceptance and protest activity in non-democratic countries. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Risk acceptance has a weaker positive   (+)    (+)   YES 
relationship on protest activity in democratic countries. 
 
Hypothesis 6.1: There is a positive relationship between   (+)    (-)   YES 
risk acceptance and ignoring party preferences. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2: There is a negative relationship between   (-)    (-)   YES 
risk acceptance and ideological conservatism. 
 
Hypothesis 6.3: There is a positive relationship between   (+)    (+)   NO 
risk acceptance and ignoring district preferences. 
 
Hypothesis 6.4: There is a negative relationship between   (-)    (-)   NO 
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTERS 4, 5, AND 6 
 
Table A4.1 Chapter 4 Control Variable Coding 
 
Social Trust: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals who believe most people can be 
trusted and 0 otherwise. 
 
Government Confidence: A four-point scale coded 0 with the lowest confidence and 3 for the 
highest confidence in the current government.  
 
Ideology: A ten-point scale where 1 is for individuals who are on the Left and 10 for individuals 
who are on the Right.  
 
Political Interest: A four-point scale coded 0 for individuals with the lowest interest in politics to 
3 for those with the highest level.  
 
Labor Member: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals who are current members of a 
labor union and 0 otherwise. 
 
Party Member: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals who are current members of a 
political party and 0 otherwise. 
 
Employment: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals who are employed and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Religiosity: A eight-point scale where 0 is for individuals that never attend religious services and 
7 for individuals that attend more than once per week. 
 
Education: Ranges from 1 for those who lack an elementary education to 8 for people who 
earned a university degree or higher.  
 
Age: Age in years. 
 
Sex: A dichotomous variable coded 1 for women and 0 for men.  
 







    Table A4.2 Binary Logit Estimates for Voting  
    Sanctions on Risk Acceptance and Voter Turnout  
    With Full Risk Scale (0-43) 
  
     
 VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
 
     
 Risk -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** 
  (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) 
 Compulsory  0.92***  --------  -------- 
  (0.23)   
 Risk x Compulsory -0.02  --------  -------- 
  (0.01)   
 Sanction  --------  0.34  -------- 
   (0.51)  
 Enforcement  -------- -0.01  -------- 
   (0.47)  
 Risk x Sanction  -------- -0.06***  -------- 
   (0.01)  
 Risk x Enforce  --------  0.06***  -------- 
   (0.02)  
 Severity  --------  --------  0.56*** 
    (0.12) 
 Risk x Severity  --------  -------- -0.01* 
    (0.004) 
 Constant -1.99*** -1.71** -2.17*** 
  (0.31) (0.58) (0.28) 
     
 Observations 28,050 28,050 28,050 
       Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008 
    Table includes all control variables from Table-4.1. Clustered standard errors 
    In parentheses.    






     Table A4.3 Hierarchical Binary Logit Estimates for Voting  
       Sanctions on Risk Acceptance (0-5) and Voter Turnout  
     
 VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
 
     
 Risk -0.05*** -0.07** -0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 Compulsory  0.70*  --------  -------- 
  (0.30)   
 Risk x Compulsory -0.01  --------  -------- 
  (0.03)   
 Sanction  --------  0.08  -------- 
   (0.40)  
 Enforcement  --------  0.20  -------- 
   (0.41)  
 Risk x Sanction  --------  0.03  -------- 
   (0.03)  
 Risk x Enforce  -------- -0.03  -------- 
   (0.03)  
 Severity  --------  --------  0.23* 
    (0.11) 
 Risk x Severity  --------  -------- -0.01 
    (0.01) 
 Constant -1.10** -0.55 -1.11* 
  (0.43) (0.51) (0.425) 
     
 Observations 29,664 29,664 29,664 
       Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008 
    Table includes all control variables from Table-4.1.  






Table A4.4 Hierarchical Binary Logit Estimates for Voting  
Sanctions on Risk Acceptance and Voter Turnout  
With Full Risk Scale (0-43) 
     
 VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
 
     
 Risk -0.002*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Compulsory  1.09*  --------  -------- 
  (0.43)   
 Risk x Compulsory -0.001  --------  -------- 
  (0.01)   
 Sanction  --------  0.29  -------- 
   (0.41)  
 Enforcement  -------- -0.01  -------- 
   (0.41)  
 Risk x Sanction  -------- -0.06***  -------- 
   (0.01)  
 Risk x Enforce  --------  0.07***  -------- 
   (0.02)  
 Severity  --------  --------  0.50 
    (0.15) 
 Risk x Severity  --------  -------- -0.002 
    (0.003) 
 Constant -2.06** -1.58** -2.10*** 
  (0.43) (0.57) (0.63) 
     
 Observations 28,050 28,050 28,050 
       Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008 
    Table includes all control variables from Table-4.1.  






Table A5.1 Full 10-Question Scale of Risk Acceptance Questions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Question 1: It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s 
own way. 
 
Question 2: It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
 
Question 3: Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that 
might be dangerous. 
 
Question 4: It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself. 
 
Question 5: It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being. 
 
Question 6: Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s 
achievements. 
 
Question 7: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life. 
 
Question 8: It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong 
 
Question 9: Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature. 
 
Question 10: Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s 
religion or family. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Respondents can choose from “Very Much Like Me”; “Like Me”; “Somewhat Like Me”; “A Little Like Me”; “Not Like Me”; “Not at All Like 







Table A5.2   Binary Logit of The Effect of Risk Acceptance on Voting and Petitioning 2006- 
          2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                    Voting                     Petitioning  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance x Non-Democracy  --------- -0.0571   ---------  0.2659*** 
      --------- (0.0459)  --------- (0.0702) 
Non-Democracy    --------- -0.1555   --------- -1.7960*** 
      --------- (0.3067)  --------- (0.3892) 
Risk Acceptance    -0.0362 -0.0503* -0.0021  -0.0633 
     (0.0217) (0.0230) (0.0312) (0.0329) 
Social Structure 
Age       0.0369***  0.0368***  0.0005  -0.0041 
     (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0034) 
Sex     -0.0950   0.0946   0.0055  -0.0097 
     (0.0564) (0.0562) (0.0572) (0.0575) 
Education     0.6212   0.0145   0.0860*  0.0841** 
     (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0384) (0.0315) 
Employment     0.6212***   0.6199***  0.2084   0.1561 
     (0.0801) (0.0803) (0.1262) (0.1353) 
Religiosity     0.0982***  0.0977*** -0.0671  -0.0679* 
     (0.0259) (0.0265) (0.0416) (0.0403) 
Motivational Attitudes 
Political Interest    0.3858***  0.3874***  0.3240***  0.3855*** 
     (0.0547)  (0.0536) (0.0855) (0.0854) 
Systems Support 
Government Confidence   0.1438**  0.1461** -0.2399* -0.1742* 
     (0.0523) (0.0511) (0.1217) (0.0836) 
Social Trust     0.1480   0.1492   0.2102   0.1814 
     (0.1079) (0.0831) (0.1552) (0.1415) 
Political Behavior 
Party Member     0.7079***  0.7092***  0.2905   0.3772** 
     (0.1268) (0.1284) (0.1517) (0.1462) 
Labor Member     0.1910*  0.1909*  0.4846***  0.4671*** 
     (0.0887) (0.0816) (0.1250) (0.1213) 
 
Constant     -1.1444  -1.1025  -0.2761   0.3943 
 
N      34,789   34,789   35,700   35,700 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the binary logit regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Year variables are excluded for  






Table A5.3 List of Democratic and Non-Democratic Countries 2006-2008 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
COUNTRY      Democracy  Nondemocracy   N 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Argentina   X     1,002 
Brazil    X     1,500 
Bulgaria   X     1,001 
Canada   X     2,164 
Egypt       X  3,051 
Ethiopia      X  1,500 
France    X     1,001 
Georgia      X  1,500  
Germany   X     4,090 
Ghana       X  1,534 
Great Britain   X     1,041 
India    X     2,001 
Indonesia   X     2,015 
Iraq       X  2,701 
Mali    X     1,534 
Moldova   X     1,046 
Netherlands   X     1,050 
Norway   X     2,152 
Peru    X     1,500 
Russia       X  2,033  
South Africa   X     2,988 
Spain    X     1,200 
Sweden   X     1,003 
Switzerland   X     1,241 
Thailand   X     1,534 
Turkey    X     1,346 
Ukraine   X     1,000 
Vietnam      X  1,495 
United States   X     1,249 
Uruguay   X     1,000 
Zambia      X  1,500 
 
Total    23   8  50,972  
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Country regimes are determined using the Freedom House Index. Democratic countries require a score of  





Table A5.4   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics by  
          Freedom House Scores 2006-2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                        Demonstrate             Boycott  
     Might Do      Have Done Might Do Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance x Freedom House  0.0218#  0.0093   0.0229***  0.0148   
     (0.0131) (0.0423) (0.0061) (0.0095) 
Freedom House    -0.2361*** -0.2378*** -0.2281*** -0.2974*** 
     (0.0387) (0.0229) (0.0329) (0.0605) 
Risk Acceptance   -0.0651   0.0093  -0.0388   0.0549 
     (0.0564) (0.0423) (0.0340) (0.0726) 
 
Constant      1.6157*  0.7246   0.2939  -1.9343*** 
 
N      26,775   26,775   26,435   26,435 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Control variables are the same as  
Table 5.1, excluded for brevity with the excluded year set to 2008. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might Do); 2 (Have Done) 








Table A5.5  Chapter 5 Control Variable Coding 
 
Freedom: A twelve-point scale reverse coded where 0 is low levels of rights and liberties and 12 
is high levels of rights and liberties.  
 
Parliament: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country is a parliamentary system of 
government and 0 otherwise.  
President Election: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if there was a presidential election and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Bicameral: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country has a bicameral legislature and 0 
otherwise. 
 
GDP: The per capita GDP for each country.  
 
Population Density: The population per square kilometer for each country. 
Political Interest: A four-point scale coded 0 for individuals with the lowest interest in politics to 
3 for those with the highest level.  
 
Employment: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals who are employed and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Education: A eight-point scale where 1 is for those who lack an elementary education and 8 is 
for people who earned a university degree or higher.  
 
Age: Age in years. 
 
Age2: is Age x Age 
 
Sex: A dichotomous variable coded 1 for women and 0 for men.  
 










Table A5.6   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics  
           2006-2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
           Demonstrate              Boycott  
    Might Do  Have Done  Might Do  Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance   0.0437*    0.0593*   0.0665**  0.1217***   
    (0.0211)  (0.0263)  (0.0242) (0.0346)  
Non-Democracy  -0.2943  -0.3714   -0.2525  -0.5832   
    (0.0211) (0.5350)  (0.3404)  (0.5290) 
   
 
Constant     0.6602* -0.2545   -0.5922# -3.0619***  
 
N     26,775    26,775    26,435   26,435   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Control variables are the same as  
Table 5.1 in the main analysis, excluded for brevity with the excluded year set to 2008. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might 







Table A5.7   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics with  
          Full 10-Question Risk Acceptance Scale 2006-2008 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                        Demonstrate             Boycott  
              Might Do      Have Done Might Do Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Full Risk Acceptance  
x Non-Democracy    0.0698**  0.0749**  0.0854***  0.0597***  
     (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0224) (0.0150) 
Non-Democracy   -1.7487*** -1.7682# -1.9758* -1.7673*** 
     (0.4248) (0.9578) (0.7900) (0.4513) 
Full Risk Acceptance   -0.0092  -0.0117   0.0094   0.0173 
     (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0128) 
 
Constant      0.1076   1.0318** -0.5510  -3.0591*** 
 
N      26,036   26,036   25,714   25,714 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Control variables are the same as  
Table 5.1 in the main analysis, excluded for brevity with the excluded year set to 2008. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1(Might 






Table A5.8   Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk  
Acceptance on Demonstrating in the United States  
___________________________________________ 
                       Might Do  
____________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance    0.1178*    
    (0.0699)  
Constant     -3.4990***  
 
N      1,137    
____________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard  
Errors presented in parentheses. Control variables are the same as Table 5.1,  
excluded for brevity. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might Do);  








Table A5.9   Hierarchical Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Protest Politics 
by System of Government 2006-2008 with Fixed-Effects 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                            Demonstrate             Boycott  
     Might Do  Have Done Might Do Have Done  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Risk Acceptance x Non-Democracy  0.1270***  0.0691*  0.1181*** -0.0336 
     (0.0262) (0.0347) (0.0268) (0.0471) 
Non-Democracy    0.2345**  0.4113***  0.1836*  0.5171*** 
     (0.0873) (0.1156) (0.0917) (0.1613) 
Risk Acceptance     0.0073    0.0348**   0.0370***  0.1163*** 
     (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0158) 
Social Structure 
Age      -0.0198*** -0.0115*** -0.0109*** -0.0012 
     (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0014) 
Sex     -0.0872** -0.0904* -0.1256*** -0.1128* 
     (0.0299) (0.0368) (0.0296) (0.0444) 
Education     0.0696***  0.1747***  0.0788***  0.2091*** 
     (0.0070) (0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0104) 
Employment      0.0545#   0.0878*  0.1343***  0.3277*** 
     (0.0304) (0.0380) (0.0301) (0.0468) 
Religiosity    -0.0012  -0.0188* -0.0366*** -0.0292*** 
     (0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0090) 
Motivational Attitudes 
Ideology    -0.0549*** -0.1835*** -0.0618*** -0.1322*** 
     (0.0067) (0.0082) (0.0066) (0.0098) 
Political Interest    0.3310***  0.5937***  0.3606***  0.6444*** 
     (0.0166)  (0.0210) (0.0165) (0.0260) 
Systems Support 
Government Confidence  -0.0565*** -0.2155*** -0.1015*** -0.2493*** 
     (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0168) (0.0260) 
Social Trust     0.0602#  0.0814*  0.2871***  0.4263*** 
     (0.0332) (0.0402) (0.0323) (0.0467) 
Political Behavior 
Party Member     0.1239*  0.5030***  0.0653   0.4471*** 
     (0.0627) (0.0685) (0.0591) (0.0740) 
Labor Member     0.1643*  0.8262***  0.2452***  0.8463*** 
     (0.0654) (0.0682) (0.0604) (0.0720) 
 
Constant       1.4320***  0.6581***  0.0921   -2.0941*** 
 
N       26,775   26,775   26,435    26,435 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Table Entry is the multinomial regression coefficient with Clustered Standard Errors presented in parentheses. Year variables are excluded for  
brevity, excluded year is 2008. Dependent variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might Do); 2 (Have Done) with baseline category “Never Do.”  
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Table A6.1 Chapter 6 Control Variable Coding 
 
Vulnerable: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if a member of the opposite party held the seat at any 
time in the past two or more election cycles and 0 otherwise.  
 
Party Chair: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if you are a party chair and 0 otherwise.  
 
Party Leader: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if you are a party leader and 0 otherwise.  
 
Major Party: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if you are the party in the majority and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Leave office: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the candidate willingly left office after the term 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Prior experience: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if candidate held elective office prior to 
congress and 0 otherwise. 
 
Self-Contributions: The percent of campaign contributions that are self-funded by each 
candidate.  
 
Citizen Contributions: The percent of campaign contributions that are donated from citizens to 
each candidate.  
 
Margin of Victory: The percentage point difference from the previous election in each district.  
 
Congress 109: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observation is in the 109th Congress and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Congress 110: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the observation is in the 110th Congress and 0 
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